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Symmetric Equilibria in Stochastic Timing Games
Jan-Henrik Steg∗
Abstract
We construct subgame-perfect equilibria with mixed strategies for symmetric stochastic
timing games with arbitrary strategic incentives. The strategies are qualitatively different
for local first- or second-mover advantages, which we analyse in turn. When there is a local
second-mover advantage, the players may conduct a war of attrition with stopping rates
that we characterize in terms of the Snell envelope from the theory of optimal stopping.
This is a very general result, but it provides a clear interpretation. When there is a
local first-mover advantage, stopping typically results from preemption and is abrupt.
Equilibria may differ in the degree of preemption, precisely when it is triggered or not.
We develop an algorithm to characterize when preemption is inevitable and to construct
corresponding payoff-maximal symmetric equilibria.
Keywords: Stochastic timing games, mixed strategies, subgame-perfect equilibrium, op-
timal stopping, Snell envelope.
JEL subject classification: C61, C73, D21, L12
1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to construct and understand subgame-perfect equilibria for symmetric
stochastic timing games, which have important applications, for instance, in strategic real
option models. It is well known that in many timing games in continuous time, there exist
no equilibria in pure strategies. If they do exist, however, they typically involve asymmetric
payoffs that only depend on the respective roles of the players, which must be determined
before the game starts. Then there is an unresolved strategic conflict. Here we strive for a
rather general existence result and possibly symmetric payoffs, so we consider mixed strategies.
In particular, no assumption is made concerning the local incentives, which can move randomly
between first- and second-mover advantages.
Restricting attention to games with a second-mover advantage is known to be helpful for
equilibrium existence. We begin by analyzing that case, too, demonstrating the general payoff
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asymmetry in pure-strategy equilibria. Our main contribution for this case is the construction
of mixed strategy equilibria with symmetric payoffs in a possibly general model, making no
specific assumptions concerning the underlyling uncertainty. Nevertheless, the equilibrium
strategies have a clear characterization and interpretation, using the concept of the Snell
envelope from optimal stopping theory. Specifically, we can describe the stopping rates which
make a player indifferent to stay in the game when forgoing a profitable local payoff. Due to
the possible uncertainty, the tradeoffs can be all in expected terms. As we are not assuming
any kind of smoothness or monotonicity of the underlying payoff processes, we also generalize
existing results for purely deterministic models.
With a first-mover advantage, there is often a preemption incentive that leads to equi-
librium existence problems, even with mixed strategies and in very simple and well-behaved
deterministic models.1 Strategy spaces and outcome distributions need to be extended to
model preemption appropriately in continuous time, which requires some coordination de-
vice (not to be confused with familiar correlated strategies).2 We use the generalization
of Fudenberg and Tirole’s (1985) concept developed in Riedel and Steg (2017) for stochas-
tic models, which affords us local equilibria of preemption reminiscent of symmetric mixed
equilibria in discrete time. Such continuation equilibria can be combined with the previous,
continuously mixed equilibria for local second-mover advantages, to establish a general ex-
istence and characterization of subgame-perfect equilibria with symmetric payoffs – without
any restriction on the order of the underlying payoff processes.
These results facilitate the analysis of richer models, e.g., of strategic real options. So
far, the focus has been either on attrition or on preemption, but feedback effects between
strategically relevant first- and second-mover advantages in different phases of one game have
not been studied much.3
Depending on the profitability of future continuation equilibria, preemption does not have
to occur just because there is a current first-mover advantage. As the term says, preemption
eliminates future continuation payoffs; so the less often preemption occurs, the higher are
potential equilibrium payoffs. To determine at which times preemption is indeed inevitable,
we provide an algorithm working under the additional assumption that simultaneous stopping
1See, e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) and Hendricks and Wilson (1992).
2Specifically, as there is no respective “next period” to charge with a threat of stopping if nobody stops in the
current one, players have to be able to prevent that everybody waits for a positive amount of time, regardlessly
of the opponents’ strategies (resp. deviations), but without the implication that all stop simultaneously with
probability one.
3See Steg and Thijssen (2015) for a model where every firm’s equilibrium option exercise can happen while
there is a first- or a second-mover advantage (each with positive probability) and for an explicit analysis of
the strategic tradeoffs. Many real options models with preemption effects also have phases with second-mover
advantages, but it is then argued that waiting is optimal (see Riedel and Steg (2017) and Steg (2018) for
general conditions when this is the case). Kwon et al. (2016) either observe preemption or attrition depending
on their initial choice of parameters. Décamps and Mariotti (2004) discuss introducing a preemption incentive
to their war of attrition, which essentially leads to a new boundary condition for their equilibrium differential
equation.
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is generally the least desirable outcome. Then we find that in any equilibrium with symmetric
payoffs in every subgame, the equilibrium payoff can never exceed the expected value of
optimally stopping the minimum of the local leader and follower payoffs. This means, no
matter how the players mix, possibly even with arbitrary public correlation and independently
of infinite remaining time, they can never benefit from a high value of the underlying payoff
processes if that is not attained by both the leader and follower payoffs simultaneously.
Then we know that the game has to end by preemption whenever the leader payoff exceeds
the equilibrium payoff bound. Iterating this procedure cumulates in the identification of times
when preemption cannot be avoided. Confining preemption to such times, we are able to
construct an equilibrium with least sustainable preemption and highest possible payoffs.
1.1 Main theorems
This paper develops three main Theorems 5.3, 7.3 and 8.2, which build on each other.
Theorem 5.3 constructs subgame-perfect equilibria with mixed strategies for games with
a systematic (weak) second-mover advantage, for instance. The players have to coordinate on
a suitable payoff process therefor, which consists of the leader payoff up to some feasible time
that either admits a simultaneous stopping equilibrium or is sufficiently late such that both
players will have stopped for sure by then. The equilibrium proceeds by optimally stopping
this fixed process. As long as there are expected gains, no player stops. When a point is
reached, however, at which it would be strictly optimal to stop, i.e., if any further delay
would imply a loss, then there needs to be a compensation in terms of some probability to
obtain the superior follower payoff. We characterize the exact stopping rate that the respective
opponent has to use to make each player indifferent to continue at such points.
Owing to its generality, this result is technically not as clear as its interpretation. With
typical Brownian models, for instance, one cannot apply local arguments as there is no path
monotonicity at all. Consequently, it is then also impossible to distinguish proper time inter-
vals on which mixing occurs – imagine a Brownian motion fluctuating around the boundary
of the region where mixing indeed takes place. Nevertheless, using martingale arguments,
we obtain a clear representation of strategies involving the concept of Snell envelope from
the theory of optimal stopping, which allows us to speak meaningfully of a (local) expected
loss, for instance. These strategies will typically be continuous up to some terminal jumps.
Another important question then is time-consistency. If we define mixed strategies for all
subgames, i.e., stopping times as starting dates, we have to ensure that they imply consistent
conditional stopping probabilities throughout the game, which is generally not trivial.
Theorem 7.3 then incorporates further strategy extensions, which provide symmetric pre-
emption equilibria for regimes with a first-mover advantage. The theorem establishes that
they form feasible continuation equilibria when leaving regimes with second-mover advantages.
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In aggregate, we thus obtain payoff-symmetric equilibria for games without any restriction on
the local incentives. There may be arbitrary, random alternations of first- or second-mover
advantages in the game.
Theorem 8.2 determines optimal symmetric equilibria. Whereas the previous ones involve
extreme preemption – whenever there is a strict first-mover advantage –, we now identify
equilibria with least sustainable preemption, resulting in the highest feasible payoffs. For that
purpose we focus on payoff-symmetric equilibria, with symmetric payoffs in every subgame,
as this property has important implications for equilibrium strategies. Roughly, conditional
stopping probabilities can only differ when players are currently indifferent between becoming
leader or follower. Under the additional assumption that simultaneous stopping is not strictly
better than leading or following, the players can coordinate at most on optimally stopping
the minimum of the leader and follower payoff processes in any equilibrium. Whenever the
leader payoff exceed that value, preemption must occur. Knowing this restricts the relevant
stopping times in the previous problem, which further reduces the attainable value. Iterating
the procedure formally as an algorithm identifies inevitable preemption points.
Theorem 8.2 establishes that we even obtain a well-defined subgame-perfect equilibrium in
the end, not only a limit value. It is based on the previous equilibria, but suppressing preemp-
tion whenever possible, and verifies that indeed well measurable, time-consistent strategies
result when applying the proposed algorithm to all subgames.
1.2 Related literature
Strategic timing problems appear in an abundance of contexts, in particular in economics but
also in biology, e.g., and consequently the related literature is vast.
On the one hand, there is a branch on deterministic timing problems in continuous time
addressing a wide range of applications, where typically a distinction is made between pre-
emption models and wars of attrition. Correspondingly, Hendricks and Wilson (1992) and
Hendricks et al. (1988) study stylized models with systematic first- and second-mover advan-
tages, respectively. A war of attrition appears in Ghemawat and Nalebuff (1985), who consider
exit from a declining industry.4 In a seminal contribution, Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) em-
phasize subgame-perfection in a symmetric preemption game. Hoppe and Lehmann-Grube
(2005) model a similar technology adoption game, allowing the leader payoff function to
be multi-peaked, but restricting the follower payoff to be nonincreasing.5 Without uncer-
tainty, these games proceed quite linearly due to perfect foresight. More complications arise
when the incentives may vary more freely. Laraki et al. (2005) consider general deterministic
4Fudenberg and Tirole (1986) analyse a market exit problem with incomplete information.
Bulow and Klemperer (1999) consider a similar problem with more than two firms.
5We discuss some implication of F not to increase in expectation, i.e., to be a supermartingale, in Section
4. Dutta et al. (1995) obtain again a similar structure as Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) (including the single-
peakedness property) from a model of product differentiation.
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N -player games with payoffs that are just continuous functions of time (for given identities
of first-movers). They prove that there do always exist ε-equilibria, but not necessarily exact
equilibria.
On the other hand, there is also a wide branch of the literature considering timing games
with uncertainty in continuous time. Dutta and Rustichini (1993), e.g., formulate a symmetric
Markovian setting. However, restricting themselves to pure strategies, their Markov perfect
equilibrium payoffs are generally asymmetric and need to assume away preemption issues.
Important and numerous applications with uncertainty are strategic real options. For
instance, an early contribution is Smets (1991). A typical symmetric model of preemptive
investment is that of Mason and Weeds (2010).6 Grenadier (1996) considers strategic real-
estate development with construction delay and Weeds (2002) irreversible R&D investment.
A war of attrition results from Murto’s (2004) model of exit from duopoly, as well as from
investment with learning externalities in Décamps and Mariotti (2004).7
Finally, as we emphasize uncertainty, the literature on Dynkin games and its large tradition
needs to be mentioned. As these are two-person, zero-sum timing games, the classical question
is the existence of an equilibrium saddle point, or value, under varying conditions. Here we
only refer to the more recent work by Touzi and Vieille (2002), as their payoff processes are
very general and – more importantly – as they also use mixed strategies. They prove that
many more Dynkin games then have a value. Their concept of mixed strategies is different,
does not consider subgames, but expected payoffs at time zero can be related to those from
our strategies.
Recently, also some more abstract work considering stochastic timing games with nonzero-
sum payoffs has been conducted. Hamadène and Zhang (2010), e.g., prove existence of a Nash
equilibrium for 2-player games with second-mover advantage throughout.8
1.3 Outline
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we define our timing games, making only
minimal regularity assumptions, and summarize the concept of subgame-perfect equilibria in
mixed strategies as developed in Riedel and Steg (2017).
Although we are generally working with mixed strategies, equilibrium verification is related
to solving optimal stopping problems by linearity. We establish a convenient representation of
this connection in Section 3 and present the needed facts from the general theory of optimal
6Pawlina and Kort (2006) consider a similar model with asymmetric investment costs and Thijssen (2010)
one with firm-specific uncertainty. Lambrecht and Perraudin (2003) model preemption with incomplete infor-
mation.
7The latter features Poisson uncertainty, in contrast to Brownian uncertainty in the other mentioned models,
which allows an analysis based on monotonically evolving beliefs and a resulting differential equation.
8See also Hamadène and Hassani (2014) for an extension to N players using a similar approach.
Laraki and Solan (2013) make less assumptions concerning the incentives in a 2-player game. Consequently,
even allowing for mixed strategies, they can only prove existence of ε-equilibria.
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stopping. On the one hand, strategies will be represented in terms of the Snell envelope, which
we motivate. On the other hand, in our games we have to be quite careful about existence of
optimal stopping times, which depends strongly on path properties of the involved processes,
so we will address some important details.
By a first application of this theory in Section 4, we establish equilibria in pure strategies
and argue that they typically generate coordination problems. These are resolved in Section 5
by the construction of subgame-perfect equilibria in mixed strategies, in a first step for games
with systematic second-mover advantage. Although our representation of the equilibrium
strategies can be well interpreted, we derive a completely explicit equilibrium for a market
exit example in Section 6.
In Section 7 we use the aforementioned strategy extensions to deal with first-mover ad-
vantages, which then enables us to construct and characterize subgame-perfect equilibria for
arbitrary symmetric timing games. Finally, we identify equilibria with maximal payoffs and
least possible preemption in Section 8. Section 9 concludes. Appendices contain some tech-
nical results and all proofs.
2 The timing game
We use the framework for subgame-perfect equilibria with mixed strategies developed in
Riedel and Steg (2017), where the concepts summarized in this section are explained in more
detail. Here we only consider symmetric games, which allows some simplifications incorpo-
rated in the following.
The timing game consists of two players i = 1, 2, who each decide when to stop in con-
tinuous time t ∈ [0,∞] (with stopping at t = ∞ interpreted as “never stopping”). Potential
uncertainty about the state of the world is modeled by a fixed probability space (Ω,F , P ), and
partial information about the true state that can evolve exogenously over time by a filtration
(Ft)t≥0. The player’s stopping decisions may of course use this information, so when a player
stops may depend on the state (see Section 2.1 for the formal definition of strategies).
As usual in timing games, we focus on situations (resp. histories) in which no player has
stopped, yet. Therefore, the game ends as soon as some player stops. A player who is the
single one to stop first is called the leader ; in this case, the other player becomes the follower.
Their respective payoffs are determined by two given stochastic processes, L = (Lt)t≥0 and
F = (Ft)t≥0. Both processes incorporate the possible effect of an (optimal, contingent)
stopping decision that the follower might have in a more primitive model, given that the
opponent has already stopped, like in Example 2.3. If the game ends by both players stopping
simultaneously, then their payoffs are determined by a third given process, M = (Mt)t≥0,
respectively the random variableM∞ if no player stops in finite time. All payoffs are measured
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in the same numeraire, say, discounted to time zero, and the players are risk neutral.9
Equilibria will obviously be based on solving optimal stopping problems involving the
three underlying payoff processes. We need to make some weak regularity assumptions in
order to have well defined problems in the following.
Assumption 2.1.
(i) (Ω,F , P ) is a fixed probability space equipped with a filtration (Ft)t≥0 satisfying the
usual conditions (i.e., right-continuity and completeness).
(ii) The processes L, F and M are adapted, right-continuous (a.s.) and of class (D), and
E[|M∞|] <∞.
(iii) min(L,F ) is upper-semi-continuous from the left in expectation, in fact on [0,∞] if we
put L∞ := F∞ :=M∞.
Remark 2.2.
(i) The payoff processes L, F and M do not have to be random; deterministic ones are just
a special case. Even then the probability space and filtration might be nontrivial and
represent possible public randomization devices. The current payoffs at any time t just
should be known by the public information Ft. The state-dependent dates identifiable
by the dynamic information (Ft) are the stopping times τ : Ω → [0,∞], i.e., those
satisfying {τ ≤ t} ∈ Ft for every t ∈ R+. They are crucial for strategies and outcomes.
Let T denote the set of all stopping times.
(ii) It depends on the model whether there is a natural payoff if both players “never stop”,
which may be some limit of M or of L. In the latter case, we simply set M∞ ≡ L∞ and
work with M∞ for a unified payoff notation. For convenience, we also formally define
F∞ :=M∞.
(iii) Two important general technical issues are measurability, in particular concerning strate-
gies, and integrability. We need to ensure that expectations are always well defined and
that pointwise converging random variables converge in expectation, too. Class (D) is
the possibly weakest integrability condition we can work with.10 Boundedness would be
much too strong for many applications (e.g., involving Brownian motion).
9Alternatively, one can interpret the payoff processes as measured in discounted “utils”.
10A measurable process (Xt)t≥0 is of class (D) if the family {Xτ | τ ∈ T , τ <∞ a.s.} is uniformly integrable.
Then the family is bounded in expectation and pointwise convergence of Xt at a stopping time τ < ∞
implies convergence in L1(P ) as well. This is a mild regularity condition implied by, e.g., E[supt |Xt|] < ∞
or supτ E[|Xτ |
p] < ∞ for some p > 1. We may equivalently define any X∞ ∈ L
1(P ) and consider all (also
nonfinite) stopping times τ in the previous set; see, e.g., Lemma B.1 in Riedel and Steg (2017).
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(iv) In order to have any general existence results for equilibria, some path regularity of the
payoff processes is necessary, as can be clearly seen even in the deterministic, single
agent case. Nevertheless, it suffices for us to have upper-semi-continuity from the left
only in expectation.11 This is also a known necessary condition for optimal stopping
problems. We use it for equilibria in mixed strategies when there is a (local) second-
mover advantage. It is of course only required for L if that never exceeds F . Indeed,
one could restrict attention to intervals [τ, inf{t ≥ τ |Lt > Ft}], where τ is a stopping
time; the area {L > F} ⊆ Ω × R+ is only relevant at transitions. The assumption is
satisfied if, e.g., the paths of L and F are a.s. (upper-semi-)continuous from the left.12
Example 2.3. Let us consider a market exit problem as a simple example for a stochastic
timing game with second-mover advantage, i.e., F ≥ L, like in the classical war of attrition.13
Suppose that two firms are operating in one market such that duopoly returns piD might
not be sustainable in the long run, depending on uncertain exogenous conditions. Whereas
each firm would in general like the opponent to leave the market in order to earn the monopoly
profit piM ≥ piD, it might be too costly to wait for that possibly random event. Each firm
thus decides on times when waiting becomes no longer promising, and at which to leave the
market if the other is still present.
The payoff processes are then given by
Lt =Mt :=
∫ t
0
piDs ds,
Ft := Lt + ess sup
τF∈T : τF≥t
E
[∫ τF
t
piMs ds
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
(2.1)
for every t ∈ [0,∞], reflecting that also a monopolist may quit at stopping times τF ∈ T (cf.
Remark 2.2 (i)) when even the monopoly return is not profitable, so that immediate exit is
dominant and the second-mover advantage not strict. However, we will not explicitly model
the strategy of a single remaining firm, but incorporate the corresponding optimal decision in
the payoff processes; subgame-perfection requires that the latter be chosen optimally.
Assumption 2.1 is satisfied by this example if piD and piM are adapted and P⊗dt-integrable,
as all processes are then bounded by an integrable random variable. The convention F∞ =
M∞ = L∞ here holds naturally. It will follow from our discussion in Section 3.1 that there
exists a right-continuous process F such that relation (2.1) holds even when replacing t by
a general stopping time τ , which is one of the most important results in continuous-time
11Upper-semi-continuity from the left in expectation means E[Lτ ∧ Fτ ] ≥ lim supn E[Lτn ∧ Fτn ] for any
sequence of stopping times (τn)n∈N that is a.s. increasing to a stopping time τ .
12Then lim supsրt(Ls ∧ Fs) ≤ (lim supsրt Ls)∧ (lim supsրt Fs) ≤ Lt ∧Ft for all t ∈ [0,∞] a.s., and we note
that L and F are of class (D).
13For related examples of preemption type, see Steg (2018).
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stopping theory.14 Moreover, Fτ is then indeed consistent with an optimal follower stopping
decision τF∗ ∈ T , τF∗ ≥ τ ; see also the discussion of a more specific instance in Section 6.
2.1 Mixed strategies and equilibrium concept
We use the following concept of subgame-perfect equilibrium for stochastic timing games
developed in Riedel and Steg (2017). As usual in timing games, the basic objects are plans
for each player when to move, resp. stop, which are followed as long as no other player stops
before.15 Consequently, the players stopping first are those whose planned times are minimal,
and then payoffs as prescribed by the given processes accrue, depending on which players’
plans are minimal. A feasible state-contingent plan is a stopping time τ , the set of which is
denoted by T (see Remark 2.2 (i)). These times are identifiable by the dynamic information
(Ft) and therefore also constitute feasible continuous-time decision nodes when to revise plans.
To describe behavior also off path, every stopping time is hence additionally considered as
the beginning of a subgame with the connotation that no player has stopped, yet. In this role,
they will typically be denoted by ϑ ∈ T .16
In any subgame, the players can randomize over remaining plans by specifying distribution
functions Gϑi on [ϑ,∞] that may still condition on the state by (Ft). A “pure” plan τ ≥ ϑ
then corresponds to Gϑi (t) = 1{t≥τ}. Plans for different subgames must be time-consistent; in
particular, randomized plans for different starting dates have to induce the same conditional
stopping probabilities whenever possible.
Additional strategy extensions are needed for subgames with first-mover advantages, to
model preemption appropriately in continuous time.17 As in Fudenberg and Tirole (1985),
the players can also place an “atom” αϑi (t) – a conditional stopping probability – on every
point t ∈ [0,∞], which is conceived to capture limit outcomes from discrete time.18 These
extensions are included in the following formal definition, although we will ignore them in the
discussion of games with a second-mover advantage and only take them up later for general
games.
Definition 2.4. An extended mixed strategy for player i ∈ {1, 2} in the subgame starting at
ϑ ∈ T is a pair of processes (Gϑi , α
ϑ
i ) that both take values in [0, 1] and satisfy the following
14This issue is more delicate for L if the leader’s payoff also depends on the stopping time eventually chosen
by the follower, like in an entry model; see Steg (2018). Optimality of the follower’s decision implies right-
continuity (in expectation) of the resulting payoff process, but not for the leader’s, because the follower’s
decision is in general unrelated to (optimally stopping) the leader’s payoff stream. Such problems will typically
not arise in diffusion models, however.
15Cf. Laraki et al. (2005) or Fudenberg and Tirole (1985), who call these plans “simple strategies.”
16Considering only deterministic times t ∈ R+ and their information structures Ft for starts of subgames
would in general be incomplete, because stopping times ϑ ∈ T and their information structures Fϑ = {A ∈
F | ∀t ∈ R+ : A ∩ {ϑ ≤ t} ∈ Ft} are (dynamically) identifiable by (Ft), but form a much richer system in
continuous time.
17See also Hendricks and Wilson (1992) on equilibrium existence issues for deterministic preemption games.
18For an actual limit analysis in the deterministic case, see Steg (2017).
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properties.
(i) Gϑi is adapted. It is a.s. nondecreasing, right-continuous, and satisfying G
ϑ
i (t) = 0 for
all t < ϑ.
(ii) αϑi is progressively measurable.
19 It is a.s. right-continuous in all t ∈ R+ for which
αϑi (t) < 1 and satisfying α
ϑ
i (t) = 0 for all t < ϑ.
20
(iii)
αϑi (t) > 0⇒ G
ϑ
i (t) = 1 for all t ≥ 0, a.s.
For every extended mixed strategy, define also Gϑi (0−) ≡ 0, G
ϑ
i (∞) ≡ 1 and α
ϑ
i (∞) ≡ 1.
We speak of a “standard” mixed strategy if αϑi (t) = 0 for all t ∈ R+, i.e., α
ϑ
i ≡ α
∞
i .
Restricting to such strategies is in the following equivalent to defining only mixed strategies
Gϑi with the given properties and no extensions at all. If furthermore G
ϑ
i (t) = 1{t≥τ} for some
stopping time τ ∈ T , then the respective strategy is referred to as “pure.” For a pair of pure
strategies, corresponding to stopping times τi, τj ≥ ϑ, player i’s expected payoff at ϑ will be
E
[
1{τi<τj}Lτi + 1{τi>τj}Fτj + 1{τi=τj}Mτi
∣∣∣Fϑ].
This is extended linearly to mixed strategies.
Definition 2.5. Given two extended mixed strategies (Gϑi , α
ϑ
i ), (G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j ), i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j,
the payoff of player i in the subgame starting at ϑ ∈ T is
V ϑi
(
Gϑi , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
)
:= E
[∫
[0,τˆϑ)
(
1−Gϑj (s)
)
Ls dG
ϑ
i (s) +
∫
[0,τˆϑ)
(
1−Gϑi (s)
)
Fs dG
ϑ
j (s)
+
∑
s∈[0,τˆϑ)
∆Gϑi (s)∆G
ϑ
j (s)Ms + λ
ϑ
L,iLτˆϑ + λ
ϑ
L,jFτˆϑ + λ
ϑ
MMτˆϑ
∣∣∣∣Fϑ
]
,
where τˆϑ := inf{t ≥ ϑ |αϑ1 (t) + α
ϑ
2 (t) > 0} and λ
ϑ
L,i, λ
ϑ
L,j and λ
ϑ
M are the terminal outcome
probabilities (of players i or j becoming leader, or simultaneous stopping, resp.) induced by
αϑi , α
ϑ
j at τˆ
ϑ and defined in Appendix C.
The outcome probabilities from the extensions sum up to (1 − Gϑi (τˆ
ϑ−))(1 − Gϑj (τˆ
ϑ−)),
the probability of nobody stopping before they are used. Their definition in Appendix C is
a simplification of that in Riedel and Steg (2017) due to slightly stronger regularity. If both
19Formally, the restricted mappings αϑi : Ω× [0, T ]→ R must be FT ⊗B([0, T ])-measurable for any T ∈ R+.
This is a stronger condition than adaptedness, but weaker than optionality, which we automatically have for
Gϑi by right-continuity. Progressive measurability implies that α
ϑ
i (τ ) will be Fτ -measurable for any τ ∈ T .
20As we are here only interested in symmetric games, we may demand αϑi (·) to be right-continuous also
where it takes the value zero, which simplifies the definition of outcomes. See Riedel and Steg (2017) for issues
with asymmetric games and corresponding weaker regularity restrictions.
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players use standard mixed strategies, in particular if they reserve some mass for t =∞, then
τˆϑ =∞, λϑL,i = λ
ϑ
L,j = 0, and the associated payoff part is (1−G
ϑ
i (∞−))(1 −G
ϑ
j (∞−))M∞.
The pathwise integrals include possible jumps of the right-continuous integrators at zero,
as player i can indeed become leader (follower) from an initial jump of Gϑi (G
ϑ
j ). Assumption
2.1 ensures that the payoffs are well defined and bounded in expectation; cf. Lemma A.1.
For a consistent dynamic view of the whole game, the conditional stopping probabilities at
any fixed time from strategies for different subgames have to be the same whenever possible.
Definition 2.6. A time-consistent extended mixed strategy for player i ∈ {1, 2} in the timing
game is a family ((Gϑi , α
ϑ
i );ϑ ∈ T ) of extended mixed strategies for all subgames such that
for all ϑ, ϑ′, τ ∈ T with ϑ ≤ ϑ′ ≤ τ it holds that (a.s.)
Gϑi (t) = G
ϑ
i (ϑ
′−) +
(
1−Gϑi (ϑ
′−)
)
Gϑ
′
i (t) for all t ≥ ϑ
′ and αϑi (τ) = α
ϑ′
i (τ).
Time-consistency implies that for any two subgames resp. starting at ϑ, ϑ′ ∈ T indeed
Gϑi ≡ G
ϑ′
i (a.s.) on the event {ϑ = ϑ
′}, as should be expected.
Definition 2.7. A subgame-perfect equilibrium is a pair of time-consistent extended mixed
strategies ((Gϑ1 , α
ϑ
1 );ϑ ∈ T ), ((G
ϑ
2 , α
ϑ
2 );ϑ ∈ T ) such that for all ϑ ∈ T , i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j,
and extended mixed strategies (Gϑa , α
ϑ
a) for the subgame at ϑ it holds that
V ϑi
(
Gϑi , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
)
≥ V ϑi
(
Gϑa , α
ϑ
a , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
)
a.s.,
i.e., such that every pair (Gϑ1 , α
ϑ
1 ), (G
ϑ
2 , α
ϑ
2 ) is an equilibrium in the subgame at ϑ ∈ T .
3 Best replies and optimal stopping
The payoffs in Definition 2.5 are apparently linear in strategies. In this section, we derive a
more explicit representation of that linearity, which will be very helpful for rigorous equilib-
rium verification and also for necessity arguments. To construct or to verify any best replies,
it is in general necessary to maximize over (extended) mixed strategies against such objects.
Here we make related statements such as “any stopping time in the support of the mixed
strategy needs to be optimal” precise. We furthermore introduce central concepts from the
theory of optimal stopping, notably the Snell envelope, which will play a crucial role in the
following representation and interpretation of mixed strategies in equilibrium.
The following arguments concern the distributions Gϑi , so we focus on “standard” mixed
strategies and ignore the extensions αϑi for notational simplicity until Section 7 (which does
not weaken our equilibrium notion as Lemma 3.1 shows).
For an alternative representation of player i’s payoff in the subgame starting at ϑ ∈ T ,
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we introduce the process Sϑi given by
Sϑi (t) :=
∫
[0,t)
Fs dG
ϑ
j (s) + ∆G
ϑ
j (t)Mt +
(
1−Gϑj (t)
)
Lt (3.1)
for all t ∈ [0,∞), where Gϑj is from a given mixed strategy for the opponent. Lemma A.2
shows that Sϑi is well behaved: like L, F , and M , it is optional
21 (so in particular adapted)
and of class (D), but not necessarily right-continuous. Given M∞ ∈ L
1(P ), we can extend the
definition of Sϑi in (3.1) to t =∞, implying also S
ϑ
i (∞) ∈ L
1(P ). Sϑi may now be integrated
by dGϑi thanks to Lemma A.1, such that player i’s expected payoff at ϑ ∈ T from a pair of
standard mixed strategies can be written as22
V ϑi
(
Gϑi , G
ϑ
j
)
= E
[∫
[0,∞]
Sϑi (t) dG
ϑ
i (t)
∣∣∣∣Fϑ
]
. (3.2)
The linearity in (3.2) suggests that a best reply exists if and only if there is a pure one.
Lemma 3.1. For any ϑ ∈ T and standard mixed strategies Gϑi , G
ϑ
j in the subgame at ϑ,
V ϑi
(
Gϑi , G
ϑ
j
)
≤ ess sup
τ∈T : τ≥ϑ
E
[
Sϑi (τ)
∣∣Fϑ] a.s., (3.3)
with equality if and only if for a.e. x ∈ [0, 1), the right-hand side is attained by the stopping
time τG,ϑi (x) := inf{t ≥ ϑ |G
ϑ
i (t) > x}. Moreover, the inequality still holds if G
ϑ
i is extended
by any feasible (nontrivial) αϑi .
Proof: In Appendix B.1.
Lemma 3.1 implies that we can speak of equilibria in pure or standard mixed strategies
in the sense of Definition 2.7, i.e., such that deviations to arbitrary extended mixed strategies
are allowed, but that it suffices to consider only other pure or standard mixed strategies.
Specifically, Lemma 3.1 indicates that Gϑi will be a best reply to G
ϑ
j if and only if for any
stopping time τ∗ with dGϑi (τ
∗) > 023 it holds that
E
[
Sϑi (τ
∗)
∣∣Fϑ] ≥ E[Sϑi (τ) ∣∣Fϑ] for all τ ∈ T with τ ≥ ϑ
21This means that Sϑi is measurable w.r.t. the optional σ-field on the product space Ω × R+, which is
generated by all right-continuous adapted processes or equivalently by the random intervals [0, τ ), τ ∈ T .
22An application of Fubini’s theorem given integrability thanks to Lemma A.1 yields in particular∫
[0,∞)
(
1−Gϑi (s)
)
Fs dG
ϑ
j (s) =
∫
[0,∞)
∫
[0,∞]
1{t>s} dG
ϑ
i (t)Fs dG
ϑ
j (s)
=
∫
[0,∞]
∫
[0,∞)
1{s<t}Fs dG
ϑ
j (s) dG
ϑ
i (t) =
∫
[0,∞]
∫
[0,t)
Fs dG
ϑ
j (s) dG
ϑ
i (t) ∈ L
1(P ).
23This means that Gϑi (t) > G
ϑ
i (τ−) for all t > τ a.s.
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(see the proof of Theorem 5.1 in Appendix B.1 for details). Therefore, we generally need to
solve the stopping problem on the right-hand side in Lemma 3.1.
A central aspect of continuous-time games of timing is their inherent discontinuity, even
if the underlying data (here L, F , and M) is continuous. For instance, from the definition
of Sϑi in (3.1) it is clear that a best reply cannot have any joint mass points when F > M ,
because Sϑi (t+) − S
ϑ
i (t) = ∆G
ϑ
j (t)
(
Ft −Mt
)
by right-continuity of L and Gϑj ; this will be a
frequent argument. Depending on Gϑj , there need not exist any stopping time that actually
attains the value of the problem, as Sϑi may have various kinds of discontinuities. Dealing
with such discontinuities will be one of the major issues.
In the following subsection, we present some crucial facts from the general theory of opti-
mal stopping in continuous time, providing in particular sufficient (and basically necessary)
conditions for the existence of optimal stopping times and their characterization in terms
of the Snell envelope. The latter is in fact our main tool to derive and represent mixed
equilibrium strategies.
3.1 Optimal stopping in continuous time
As a motivating stopping problem to present the theory, consider the unilateral problem of
when to become the leader optimally, i.e., supposing the opponent will never move. This
problem will play an important role in the following.24
It is well established how to characterize the solution of the optimal stopping problem
VL(0) := ess sup
τ∈T
E
[
Lτ
]
given Assumption 2.1. In fact, our payoff process L is right-continuous (hence optional, cf.
fn. 21) and of class (D), so we can apply the general theory of optimal stopping as in, e.g.,
Mertens (1972) and Bismut and Skalli (1977): There exists a smallest supermartingale UL
dominating the payoff process L, called the Snell envelope of L, which satisfies
UL(ϑ) = ess sup
τ∈T : τ≥ϑ
E
[
Lτ
∣∣Fϑ] a.s. (3.4)
for all stopping times ϑ ∈ T . In particular, UL(0) = VL(0). We remark that one can well
define the right-hand side of (3.4) for any ϑ ∈ T , but the key insight is that there exists a
well behaved process UL = (UL(t))t≥0 that can be evaluated at any stopping time ϑ to know
the continuation value then. In view of the dynamic programming principle, we also need to
consider continuation problems at stopping times; the latter are feasible quantities, but much
richer than deterministic times.
24To stay in the framework of the game and to find a (pure) best reply to G0j given by 1{t≥∞}, we have to
use the payoff M∞ for not stopping in finite time. Recall our convention L∞ ≡M∞, however.
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Now UL is optional and of class (D) as well,
25 and such supermartingales have very con-
venient regularity properties: There exists a Doob-Meyer decomposition26
UL =ML −DL
that we extensively use, with a uniformly integrable, right-continuous martingale27 ML and
a nondecreasing, predictable and integrable process DL. The latter can be interpreted as
measuring the expected loss from stopping too late: If we ignore to stop before any τ ∈ T ,
then we cannot achieve more than E[UL(τ)] = UL(0) − E[DL(τ)], even if we stop optimally
from τ onwards.
Reflecting the dynamic programming principle, the value process UL is a martingale as
long as there still exists a future time τ ∈ T giving at least the same value in expectation
as stopping immediately. Whether there exists any optimal stopping time depends on the
continuity properties of DL. If L is upper-semi-continuous in expectation (as by Assumption
2.1 (iii) if L ≤ F , e.g.), then DL has left-continuous paths a.s.
28 By right-continuity of L, DL
will be even continuous.29 With left-continuous DL, there exist the optimal stopping times
30
τ∗L(ϑ) := inf
{
t ≥ ϑ
∣∣UL(t) = Lt} and τ∗∗L (ϑ) := inf{t ≥ ϑ ∣∣DL(t) > DL(ϑ−)}. (3.5)
They are the respectively smallest and largest stopping times after ϑ ∈ T attaining31
UL(ϑ) = E
[
Lτ∗
L
(ϑ)
∣∣∣Fϑ] = E[Lτ∗∗
L
(ϑ)
∣∣∣Fϑ] a.s. (3.6)
Hence, by optimality it must hold that UL = L a.s. at any point of increase of DL, which
25See Mertens (1972), Théorème T4 for the existence and Théorème T5 and proof for UL being of class (D).
26See Mertens (1972), Théorème T3.
27Therefore, the crucial optional sampling holds: ML(σ) = E[ML(τ ) |Fσ] for all σ ≤ τ ∈ T . Moreover, ML
has a last element ML(∞) to which it converges in L
1(P ).
28See Bismut and Skalli (1977), Théorème II.2 and proof. (Semi-) Continuity in expectation is in general
weaker than the corresponding path property from the left.
Our payoff processes are not necessarily positive. However, if L is optional and of class (D), the same will be
true for its negative part L− := max(−L, 0), which thus has a Snell envelope UL− =ML− −DL− decomposing
into a uniformly integrable right-continuous martingale ML− and an integrable increasing process DL− . Then
ML− −L
− ≥ 0, implying L+ML− ≥ 0. Adding the martingale ML− neither affects L being optional, of class
(D), or (semi-) continuous in expectation, nor any optimal stopping times for L.
29See Bismut and Skalli (1977), (2.15), where right-continuity of the payoff process implies in fact Z+ = X.
30Example: L not upper-semi-continuous ⇒ inf{DL > 0} not optimal.
ML
L
DL
ML
L
DL
31See Bismut and Skalli (1977), Théorème II.3.
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implies in fact32 ∫
[0,∞]
(UL(t)− Lt) dDL(t) = 0 a.s. (3.7)
4 Equilibria in pure strategies
In symmetric games with systematic second-mover advantage F ≥ L, it is straightforward to
identify certain subgame-perfect equilibria in pure strategies. Player j, say, just has to stop
sufficiently late, such that i will solve the problem of optimally stopping L presented in Section
3.1. We show in this section that such pure strategy equilibria typically entail asymmetric
payoffs, however. The respective roles of the players have to be determined before the game
starts, and correspondingly who obtains the higher payoff. With mixed strategies that we will
consider thereafter, equilibria with symmetric payoffs are obtained that do not create another
strategic conflict outside the model.
Stopping sufficiently late to support a pure strategy equilibrium need not be “never”:
Whenever it is optimal to stop L, it simply must not be worthwhile for player i to wait until
j stops, in order to become follower then. This will be the case, e.g., if j only stops when
F = L – like at τj ≡ ∞.
The easiest example is thus Gϑj given by 1{t=∞} and G
ϑ
i by 1{t≥τ∗L(ϑ)} for every ϑ ∈ T , or
analogously with τ∗∗L (ϑ) defined in (3.5). In either case, waiting is indeed optimal for player
j on [0,∞), because it is never strictly better to realize L before an optimal stopping time,
and F dominates L at both τ∗L(ϑ) and τ
∗∗
L (ϑ).
There can also be quite complex patterns based on the same logic, but with players
switching roles across subgames. This can be illustrated best with a little more structure
like in Example 2.3, where the follower’s optimal stopping times are “sufficiently late” for
an equilibrium. However, the arguments are more general: The exploited properties are
F ≥ L ≥ M and that F is a supermartingale, i.e., becoming follower sooner is better than
later.33 Then finding a stopping time that is optimal from τ∗L(ϑ) on is enough (for any G
ϑ
j ).
Lemma 4.1. Suppose F ≥ L ≥M and that F is a supermartingale. For any ϑ ∈ T , standard
mixed strategy Gϑj in the corresponding subgame, and stopping time τi ≥ ϑ it holds that
E
[
Sϑi
((
τi ∨ τ
∗
L(ϑ)
)
+
) ∣∣∣Fϑ] ≥ E[Sϑi (τi) ∣∣∣Fϑ]
and
32For L right-continuous and upper-semi-continuous in expectation, DL is continuous, so UL inherits right-
continuity from ML. Then, by (3.5), (3.6) and right-continuity of UL − L, inf{t ∈ R+ |
∫ t
0
1{UL−L≥ε} dDL >
0} =∞ a.s. for any ε > 0, i.e., UL − L < ε dDL-a.e. with probability one, implying the claim. (3.7) still holds
without right-continuity of UL − L, as long as L is upper-semi-continuous in expectation; see Remark B.1 in
the appendix.
33These also hold in phases with second-mover advantage of typical market entry games; see Steg (2018).
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E
[
Sϑi
(
τ∗L(ϑ)+
) ∣∣∣Fϑ] ≥ E[Lτ∗
L
(ϑ)
∣∣∣Fϑ] a.s.
So, if a stopping time τ∗i ≥ τ
∗
L(ϑ) attains ess supτ≥τ∗L(ϑ)
E[Sϑi (τ) |Fτ∗L(ϑ)], then it also attains
E[Sϑi (τ
∗
i ) |Fϑ] = ess supτ≥ϑE[S
ϑ
i (τ) |Fϑ] ≥ E[Lτ∗L(ϑ) |Fϑ]. All claims also hold with τ
∗∗
L (ϑ)
instead.
Proof: In Appendix B.1.
Note that the supermartingale property of F is important for the result, to ensure relatively
high payoffs for the case of becoming follower before the optimum of L is reached. It is not
enough that there are even strictly better future stopping times for L and that F ≥ L: If Gϑj
puts mass between ϑ and τ∗L(ϑ), when F still dominates L but when both are very low, then it
may be worthwhile to secure the current payoff Lϑ due to the risk of becoming follower while
waiting for the optimum of L. An alternative condition would be that L is a submartingale
on [ϑ, τ∗L(ϑ)].
In Example 2.3, L =
∫ ·
0 pi
D ds is the duopolists’ payoff process. Then the optimal stopping
times in the follower’s problem are sufficiently late to support an equilibrium: the perspective
to become follower (monopolist) at a time when immediate exit is optimal has no value, and it
leads to ceding when piD seems an unsustainable loss – at τ∗L(ϑ). Indeed, as a monopolist stops∫ ·
0 pi
M ds with piM ≥ piD, that optimal stopping time satisfies τF (ϑ) ≥ τ
∗
L(ϑ). Furthermore,
it holds that F = L = M a.s. at τF (ϑ), so in particular simultaneous stopping is feasible
on {τ∗L(ϑ) = τF (ϑ)} by F = M . These properties generate a whole class of equilibria with
varying roles of the players, decided by events C at τ∗L(ϑ).
Proposition 4.2. Suppose F ≥ L ≥ M and that F is a supermartingale. Let ϑ ∈ T and
consider a stopping time τF (ϑ) ≥ τ
∗
L(ϑ) a.s., such that at τF (ϑ) we have F = L, and more
specifically F = M on the set {τF (ϑ) = τ
∗
L(ϑ)} (a.s.) – e.g., τF (ϑ) := inf{t ≥ ϑ |Ft = Mt}.
Then, for any given event C ∈ Fτ∗
L
(ϑ), the pure strategies corresponding to
τ∗1 = τ
∗
L(ϑ)1{C} + τF (ϑ)1{Cc} and τ
∗
2 = τ
∗
L(ϑ)1{Cc} + τF (ϑ)1{C}
form an equilibrium in the subgame starting at ϑ.
Proof: In Appendix B.1.
Equilibria in pure strategies typically involve asymmetric payoffs, for instance if F > L at
τ∗L(ϑ) in those that we have specified. Consequently, there arises a coordination problem before
the start of the game, each player wanting to become follower eventually. This problem is even
aggravated in the equilibria of Proposition 4.2, where the roles may switch across subgames.
For this reason, such equilibria are also difficult to aggregate for a subgame-perfect equilibrium:
for each subgame starting at some ϑ ∈ T , an event C ∈ Fτ∗
L
(ϑ) has to be agreed on that
determines the respective roles.
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Maybe even more importantly, no player can obtain the preferred follower payoff by taking
or threatening to take a certain action, but only by the threat of taking no action for a longer
time, which has to induce the opponent to stop. Effectively, players compete in the credibility
of taking no action. Such problems can be avoided by allowing for mixed strategies, making
the players indifferent about the roles when stopping occurs. This is our topic in the following.
5 Equilibria in mixed strategies
The very universal principle of the Snell envelope allows us to construct equilibria in mixed
strategies in our general setting. But we do not only obtain existence: the equilibrium strate-
gies can be clearly interpreted like the Snell envelope itself. Recall that the compensator
relates to the expected loss from stopping too late.
The logic of the following equilibria in symmetric games is this: If F ≥ L, but without
the other conditions of Lemma 4.1, then waiting for future optimal times to stop L is not
necessarily always optimal in the game. Nevertheless, the players have an incentive and the
possibility to coordinate on waiting, which can be extended until the latest optimal time to
stop L, τ∗∗L (ϑ). To cross that point, however, any player has to be compensated by some
chance to become follower when F > L, because otherwise any delay would definitely be
costly. Of course, the opponent has to be willing to provide that chance, so we identify
the suitable rate to compensate exactly the impending loss dDL > 0 and make both players
indifferent.
This principle does not work when L > F , however, when the players would want to stop
much more intensely due to preemption incentives (see Section 7). On the other hand, even if
we were considering games without first-mover advantage, then there might be equilibria with
even higher symmetric payoffs – if simultaneous stopping is feasible and sufficiently profitable
at some future time, precisely when M ≥ F > L. For these reasons, we need to generalize
the appropriate payoff process that the players coordinate on.
Theorem 5.1. Let ϑ, τϑ ∈ T be stopping times with τϑ ∈ [ϑ, inf{t ≥ ϑ |Lt > Ft}] a.s. Define
the auxiliary process L˜τ
ϑ
by L˜τ
ϑ
t := 1{t<τϑ}Lt + 1{t≥τϑ}max(Fτϑ ,Mτϑ), let D
τϑ
L˜
denote the
compensator of its Snell envelope and τϑi := inf{t ≥ ϑ |
∫
[ϑ,t] 1{F≤L} dD
τϑ
L˜
> 0} ∧ τϑ.
Then there exists a payoff-symmetric equilibrium in the subgame starting at ϑ with standard
mixed strategies given by
Gϑi (t) = 1− 1{t<τϑ
i
} exp
(
−
∫ t
ϑ
1{Fs>Ls} dD
τϑ
L˜
(s)
Fs − Ls
)
(5.1)
and
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Gϑj (t) = 1− 1{t<τϑ} exp
(
−
∫ t
ϑ
1{Fs>Ls} dD
τϑ
L˜
(s)
Fs − Ls
)
(5.2)
for i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j, if and only if a.s. ∆Gϑi (M − F ) ≤ 0 at τ
ϑ
i on {τ
ϑ
i < τ
ϑ} and
∆Gϑi (M − F ) ≥ 0 at τ
ϑ.
Moreover, there exists a symmetric equilibrium with both players using the strategy given
by (5.1) if and only if a.s. ∆Gϑi (M − F ) ≥ 0 at τ
ϑ
i , with equality on {τ
ϑ
i < τ
ϑ} whenever
∆Gϑi (τ
ϑ
i ) < 1.
Proof: In Appendix B.1.
On {Lϑ > Fϑ}, τ
ϑ = ϑ, and Mϑ ≥ Fϑ is required to support simultaneous stopping. On
{Fϑ ≥ Lϑ}, the “terminal condition” at τ
ϑ
i seems contradictory, but it plays the following role.
First consider ∆Gϑi (τ
ϑ) > 0, so τϑi = τ
ϑ, and there is a joint terminal jump. This means that
the players coordinate on the terminal payoff Mτϑ , which again requires Mτϑ ≥ Fτϑ (where
M∞ = F∞ by convention). G
ϑ
i can also jump to one before τ
ϑ: when F = L and dDτ
ϑ
L˜
> 0,
such that no compensation is possible. Then player i stops, but we keep Gϑj continuous to
address the case F = L > M , and payoffs are hence symmetric. This choice can only be an
equilibrium, however, if indeed F ≥ M . Otherwise, player j could obtain a higher payoff by
stopping at τϑi and not supporting the equilibrium earlier on, but we could then adjust τ
ϑ to
ensure suitable continuation values. Finally, if Gϑi reaches the value one continuously, then
Gϑj (t) = G
ϑ
i (t) for all t ∈ R+. This case is one reason for defining L˜
τϑ with max(Fτϑ ,Mτϑ):
Then ∆Gϑi (M − F ) ≥ 0 holds at τ
ϑ by ∆Gϑi = 0, which allows L˜
τϑ to have the terminal
value Fτϑ > Mτϑ and affects the continuation values before. Another reason is that we will
obtain continuation equilibria with payoff max(Fτϑ ,Mτϑ) when considering extended mixed
strategies in Section 7.
Except for possible terminal jumps, the strategies in Theorem 5.1 are continuous. As moti-
vated before and given the appropriate process L˜τ
ϑ
, the opponent’s stopping rate dDτ
ϑ
L˜
/(F−L)
makes each player indifferent when it would seem optimal to secure the current value of L.
The expected loss from forgoing it is exactly compensated by the probability of obtaining
F > L. The resulting equilibrium payoffs are given by
V ϑi (G
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j ) = V
ϑ
j (G
ϑ
j , G
ϑ
i ) = ess sup
τ∈T : τ≥ϑ
E
[
1{τ<τϑ}Lτ+1{τ≥τϑ}max(Fτϑ ,Mτϑ)
∣∣∣Fϑ] =: U τϑL˜ (ϑ),
resp., if both players use Gϑi and this is an equilibrium, by
V ϑi (G
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
i ) = U
τϑ
L˜
(ϑ) + E
[
1{τi<τϑ}1{∆Gi(τi)>0}
(
Mτi − Fτi
) ∣∣∣Fϑ].
These can be rewritten using the first time that a delay becomes costly for L˜τ
ϑ
, denoted by
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τ∗∗
L˜
(ϑ) := inf{t ≥ ϑ |Dτ
ϑ
L˜
(t) > Dτ
ϑ
L˜
(ϑ)}; cf. (3.6). Then V ϑi (G
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j ) = E[L˜
τϑ
τ∗∗
L˜
(ϑ) |Fϑ] and
V ϑi (G
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
i ) = E
[
L˜τ
ϑ
τ∗∗
L˜
(ϑ) + 1{τ∗∗
L˜
(ϑ)<τϑ}∩{Lτ∗∗
L˜
(ϑ)=Fτ∗∗
L˜
(ϑ)}
(
Mτ∗∗
L˜
(ϑ) − L˜
τϑ
τ∗∗
L˜
(ϑ)
)∣∣∣Fϑ].
The proof of Theorem 5.1 is based on martingale arguments. An important aspect is to
take care of the different kinds of jumps in the strategies and to ensure that the underlying
payoff process L˜τ
ϑ
has the necessary properties (e.g., that Dτ
ϑ
L˜
is continuous). Moreover,
when stopping happens continuously, this may be at a rate with respect to time (dt) like in
the explicit Brownian example in Section 6, but not necessarily, and continuous strategies can
also charge a set of time points of measure zero.34
The present equilibrium strategies are trivial – given that the endpoint is feasible – if L
or F is a (sub-)martingale on [ϑ, τϑ]; then there is no loss from waiting and dDτ
ϑ
L˜
≡ 0.35
Remark 5.2. It may happen that DL˜ – and hence G
ϑ
i – has jumps if L is only upper-semi-
continuous from the right (and the left). In Theorem 5.1, waiting is always at least as good as
obtaining L and there must be indifference at increases of DL˜. Joint mass points are therefore
impossible when L > M .36 However, Theorem 5.1 remains true if L ≡M (e.g., in an attrition
model); see Remark B.1 in the appendix.
The equilibria of Theorem 5.1 can so far only deal with subgames satisfying Mϑ ≥ Fϑ on
{Lϑ > Fϑ}. Therefore, if we want to aggregate them for a subgame-perfect equilibrium, we
have to assume this for all subgames for the moment. Then setting τϑ = inf{t ≥ ϑ |Lt >
Ft or Mt > Ft} will satisfy the existence conditions. In the special case that F ≥ max(L,M)
throughout, this implies simply τϑ ≡ ∞ and then L˜τ
ϑ
= L and Dτ
ϑ
L˜
= DL. In this case, the
stopping rates do not depend on ϑ, which ensures time-consistency.
In general, however, we may have Dτ
ϑ
L˜
6= DL on [ϑ, τ
ϑ], specifically when max(F,M) > L
or max(F,M) < UL at τ
ϑ <∞. Then time-consistency requires that τϑ will not be changed if
it has not been passed, yet: For any two ϑ, ϑ′ ∈ T , we should have τϑ = τϑ
′
on {ϑ ≤ ϑ′ ≤ τϑ}
and vice versa, or in summary τϑ = τϑ
′
on {(ϑ ∨ ϑ′) ≤ (τϑ ∧ τϑ
′
)}.
Then we indeed obtain payoff-symmetric subgame-perfect equilibria with standard mixed
strategies for games, e.g., with systematic second-mover advantage.
34In this case, dGϑi would be a singular measure, which often appear in optimal control of Brownian models.
35Cf. Theorem 3.3 in Riedel and Steg (2017) for this case, but also their Section 4.3 on issues in asymmetric
games.
36Example: No symmetric payoff equilibrium if L (> M) not right-continuous.
F
L
M
T1 T2
Waiting is strictly optimal for player i at t ∈ (T1, T2) if Gj(T2−) > Gj(t),
so Gi(T2−) = Gi(T1) and Gj(T2−) = Gj(T1) by payoff symmetry, giving a
continuation payoff L(T2) on (T1, T2]. The only symmetric continuation payoff
at T1 is then in (L(T2), L(T1)) from ∆Gi(T1) = ∆Gj(T1) ∈ (0, 1). Waiting is
also strictly dominant on [0, T1), but stopping short of T1 now yields a higher
payoff than stopping at T1.
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Theorem 5.3. Fix i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j. If (Gϑi ;ϑ ∈ T ), (G
ϑ
j ;ϑ ∈ T ) are such that for every
ϑ ∈ T , Gϑi , G
ϑ
j satisfy the conditions for an equilibrium in the subgame starting at ϑ as in
Theorem 5.1, and the associated (τϑ;ϑ ∈ T ) satisfy τϑ = τϑ
′
a.s. on {(ϑ ∨ ϑ′) ≤ (τϑ ∧ τϑ
′
)}
for all ϑ, ϑ′ ∈ T , then (Gϑi ;ϑ ∈ T ) and (G
ϑ
j ;ϑ ∈ T ) represent a subgame-perfect equilibrium
in standard mixed strategies. This is the case, e.g., if max(Ft−Lt,Mt−Ft) ≥ 0 for all t ∈ R+
a.s. and τϑ = inf{t ≥ ϑ |Lt > Ft or Mt > Ft} for every ϑ ∈ T .
Proof: In Appendix B.1.
Even if the required time-consistency condition for the family (τϑ;ϑ ∈ T ) holds, the
family (Dτ
ϑ
L˜
;ϑ ∈ T ) needs to induce time-consistent stopping rates (dGϑi ;ϑ ∈ T ). This is
the main point of (the proof of) Theorem 5.3, given optimality by Theorem 5.1.
6 Example: Exit from duopoly
In this section, we illustrate the simplification resulting from a systematic second-mover ad-
vantage pointed out in the context of Theorem 5.1. Specifically, we determine subgame-perfect
equilibrium strategies by explicitly deriving the Snell envelope UL and its compensator DL
for a version of the market exit game in Example 2.3. The stopping rate during attrition is
then represented in terms of a sustained flow of losses from unprofitable operations.
To specify the model, assume that at each time t, discounted duopoly profits are given by
piDt = e
−rt(Yt − c),
where c > 0 is a constant operating cost and revenues (Yt)t≥0 follow a geometric Brownian
motion solving dYt = µYt dt + σYt dBt. The profit stream of a remaining monopolist is
piMt = e
−rt(mYt − c),
where m > 1. Each firm can decide to leave the market with accumulated payoff Lt = Mt =∫ t
0 e
−rs(Ys− c) ds, for example when Y is so low that revenue does not cover production costs.
In such a phase, the game is a war of attrition if monopoly still seems profitable. However, it
may also be optimal to stop immediately in the follower’s problem with payoff
Ft = Lt + ess sup
τF∈T : τF≥t
E
[∫ τF
t
e−rs(mYs − c) ds
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
.
The latter problem is a standard exercise under the condition r > max(µ, 0),37 and its unique
37This is also necessary and sufficient for the processes to be of class (D) in accordance with Assumption
2.1. Then −c/r ≤ Lt ≤
∫∞
0
e−rs |Ys − c| ds ∈ L
1(P ) and similarly for F , inserting m.
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solution is to stop as soon as Y , starting from Yt, falls below the threshold
ym =
β2
β2 − 1
r − µ
r
c
m
<
c
m
,
where β2 is the negative root of the quadratic equation
1
2σ
2β(β − 1) + µβ − r = 0. The value
of the stopping problem can be explicitly expressed as
Ft − Lt = e
−rt1{Yt>ym}
[
mYt
r − µ
−
c
r
−
(
Yt
ym
)β2 (mym
r − µ
−
c
r
)]
, (6.1)
which shows that F is a continuous process, Fτ corresponds to an optimal follower decision
from τ ∈ T , and Ft = Lt (= Mt)⇔ Yt ≤ ym. Hence, for any equilibrium as in Theorem 5.1,
we need τϑ ≥ inf{t ≥ ϑ |Yt ≤ ym} for the endpoint condition. On the other hand, stopping is
strictly dominant for a monopolist as soon as Yt ≤ ym, and so it is in duopoly, where revenues
can never exceed those in monopoly. Therefore, we can choose τϑ = inf{t ≥ ϑ |Yt ≤ ym}
without loss of generality and it will lead to a symmetric equilibrium at any ϑ ∈ T as follows.
As F is a supermartingale bym ≥ 1 and dominates L, it also dominates the Snell envelope
UL of the latter, such that we have F = L⇒ F = UL = L. Consequently, L˜
τϑ from Theorem
5.1 is here just L stopped at τϑ, and the Snell envelope U τ
ϑ
L˜
coincides with UL until τ
ϑ.
Applying the right-hand side of (6.1) with m = 1 yields the solution to optimally stopping
the leader (duopoly) payoff:
UL(t) = ess sup
τ∈T : τ≥t
E[Lτ |Ft] = Lt + e
−rt1{Yt>y1}
[
Yt
r − µ
−
c
r
−
(
Yt
y1
)β2 ( y1
r − µ
−
c
r
)]
.
Applying Ito¯’s lemma shows that the monotone part of the supermartingale UL is just the
drift
dDL(t) = −1{Yt<y1} dLt = 1{Yt<y1}e
−rt(c− Yt) dt
when stopping L immediately is optimal. With τϑ = inf{t ≥ ϑ |Yt ≤ ym} for every ϑ ∈ T ,
dDτ
ϑ
L˜
= dDL, and (6.1), we now have a fully explicit symmetric subgame-perfect equilibrium,
with payoffs V ϑi (G
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j ) = UL(ϑ), respectively.
As ym < y1 < c, we see that dDL is simply the stream of losses resulting from unprofitable
operations. If a duopolist never hoped to become monopolist, these losses would be too large
to keep operating. Here, whenever Y ∈ (ym, y1), both firms are leaving duopoly at a rate that
depends directly on those running losses; it is decreasing in Y . The state may rise next to
the region (y1, c). Then there are still running losses, but the firms suspend mixing because
the option to wait for a market recovery is sufficiently valuable. There is thus no need for
a compensation. Typically, there will be alternating periods of continuous and no mixing.
When the state drops to [0, ym], however, the option to wait for market recovery would be
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worthless in the face of running losses even if a firm was (sure to become) monopolist, and
both firms quit immediately.
7 Equilibria for general symmetric games
7.1 Preemption with extended mixed strategies
In a preemption situation, i.e., when there is a first-mover advantage L > F , there typically
exist no equilibria in pure strategies in continuous time. Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) and
Hendricks and Wilson (1992) show that this issue arises when there is an incentive to wait (L
is increasing). If the model is sufficiently regular and the first-mover advantage is strict, then
one may have equilibria in standard mixed strategies, with one player stopping immediately
and the other stopping at a sufficient rate, such that the first would not be able to realize the
increase in L. The payoffs are then asymmetric, L and F . However, these equilibria cannot be
extended to the boundary of the preemption region; if L = F , then the stopping rate needed
to support any equilibrium explodes. This observation does not depend on any regularity
conditions – the payoff processes can be deterministic and arbitrarily smooth.
Therefore, if we want to allow for any equilibria when preemption is about to start (or also
symmetric payoffs when L > F ), then we need to enrich the strategy and outcome spaces.
The key is to facilitate some partial coordination when players try to stop at the same time,
but when simultaneous stopping would be the worst outcome. Therefore, we are now going
to use the strategy extensions αϑi from Definition 2.4. With these extended strategies, it is
possible to capture continuous-time limits of symmetric, mixed discrete-time equilibria, which
do not have the previous issues.38
We then obtain the following equilibria of immediate stopping for subgames with a first-
mover advantage – here for a symmetric game:39
Proposition 7.1 (Cf. Proposition 3.1 in Riedel and Steg (2017)). Fix ϑ ∈ T and suppose
ϑ = inf{t ≥ ϑ |Lt > Ft} a.s. Then (G
ϑ
1 , α
ϑ
1 ), (G
ϑ
2 , α
ϑ
2 ) defined by
αϑi (t) =


1 if Mt ≥ Ft and t = inf{s ≥ t |Ls > Fs},
1{Lt>Ft}
Lt − Ft
Lt −Mt
else
for any t ∈ [ϑ,∞) and Gϑi = 1{t≥ϑ}, i = 1, 2, are an equilibrium in the subgame at ϑ.
38In discrete time, there can be equilibria with a positive probability of simultaneous stopping even if that is
the worst outcome, because the players can only assign positive probabilities to the single periods; one cannot
circumvent coordination failure by stopping an arbitrarily small time ε > 0 after a mass point of the opponent.
See Steg (2017) for a discretized preemption model and a formal limit analysis.
39The present extension of Proposition 3.1 in Riedel and Steg (2017) to a nonempty set {M > F} is straight-
forward in the symmetric case.
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The resulting payoffs are V ϑi (G
ϑ
i , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j ) = max(Fϑ,Mϑ).
Remark 7.2. When L > F ≥ M , then the choice of αϑi makes the respective other player
indifferent between stopping and waiting, and αϑi (·) is right-continuous, allowing a limit out-
come argument. When M > F , stopping is of course the unique best reply. In the polar case
Lt = Ft = Mt, there might not be a right-hand limit of 1{Lt>Ft}
Lt−Ft
Lt−Mt
, so we set αϑi (t) = 1.
If the limit does exist, then it can be used to make αϑi (·) right-continuous even here, as the
players will be indifferent in this case.
If Lϑ = Fϑ > Mϑ, then each player becomes leader or follower with probability
1
2 .
40 This is
the same outcome as in Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) for their smooth, deterministic model.
If Lϑ > Fϑ > Mϑ, however, then there is a positive probability of simultaneous stopping,
which is the price of preemption, driving the payoffs down to Fϑ.
7.2 General symmetric equilibria
We can now combine the equilibria obtained for F ≥ L or L > F . With standard mixed
strategies, the equilibria for a (temporary) second-mover advantage from Theorem 5.1 depend
on the “terminal condition” ∆Gϑi (M−F ) ≥ 0, e.g., when a preemption regime may start with
both players trying to stop immediately. Proposition 7.1, however, gives us “continuation”
equilibria of immediate stopping at such transitions with payoffs max(F,M). Indeed, if player
j uses an extended mixed strategy, then the payoff difference for player i between stopping
and waiting when Gϑj jumps to one at τˆ
ϑ
j = inf{t ≥ ϑ |α
ϑ
j (t) > 0} changes from ∆G
ϑ
j (M −F )
to
∆Gϑj
(
αϑjM +
(
1− αϑj
)
L− F
)
,
which is nonnegative if αϑj is as in Proposition 7.1. Therefore, this possibility to coordinate
partially in preemption also generates suitable endpoints for attrition regimes when we cannot
have M ≥ F before reaching {L > F}.
We thus obtain a payoff-symmetric subgame-perfect equilibrium for any symmetric timing
game – where the payoff processes L, F and M do not depend on the individual players.
Theorem 7.3. Under Assumption 2.1, there exists a payoff-symmetric subgame-perfect equi-
librium in extended mixed strategies ((Gϑ1 , α
ϑ
1 );ϑ ∈ T ), ((G
ϑ
2 , α
ϑ
2 );ϑ ∈ T ) given as follows:
Pick i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j. For any ϑ ∈ T , set τϑ := inf{t ≥ ϑ |Lt > Ft or Mt > Ft}.
Define Gϑi , G
ϑ
j as in Theorem 5.1 and α
ϑ
i = α
ϑ
j as in Proposition 7.1.
Moreover, if L, F , and M are such that for every stopping time τ ∈ T it holds that
Lτ = Fτ ⇒ Fτ = Mτ or τ = inf{t > τ |Lt > Ft} a.s., then there is a symmetric subgame-
perfect equilibrium where each player’s strategy is given by (Gϑi , α
ϑ
i ) for every ϑ ∈ T .
40Then the lim inf and lim sup in Definition C.1 are both 1
2
with the strategies of Proposition 7.1.
23
Proof: In Appendix B.1.
The idea of these equilibria is basically pasting the war of attrition on {F ≥ L} using the
continuous strategies from Theorem 5.1 with the preemption equilibria of immediate stopping
on {L > F} by extended mixed strategies from Proposition 7.1. However, we had to prepare
well for doing so, because the precise attrition behavior depends strongly on the continuation
payoffs, resp. when preemption starts.
By the upper-semi-continuity of Assumption 2.1 (iii), it feasible during attrition that the
players coordinate on a future continuation equilibrium with payoffs max(F,M). Then there
will be no predictable drop in payoffs from starting preemption. The corresponding symmetric
equilibrium payoffs are given by
ess sup
τ∈T : τ≥ϑ
E
[
1{τ<τϑ}Lτ + 1{τ≥τϑ}max(Fτϑ ,Mτϑ)
∣∣∣Fϑ]
with τϑ = inf{t ≥ ϑ |Lt > Ft or Mt > Ft} for any ϑ ∈ T .
Whereas the endpoint condition ∆Gϑi (M−F ) ≥ 0 at τ
ϑ is now replaced by the preemption
continuation equilibria, we still need to ensure the second one, ∆Gϑi (M − F ) ≤ 0 at τ
ϑ
i ;
imposing the cap τϑ∧ inf{t ≥ ϑ |Mt > Ft} works in general, but there may also be alternative
choices in more specific cases. The proof of Theorem 7.3 relies of course on those of Theorem
5.1 and Proposition 7.1. The main issue is that the former was formulated in a reduced setting
with “standard” mixed strategies, so we establish a formal relation to the present setting with
extended mixed strategies.
8 Optimal symmetric equilibrium
The equilibria of Theorem 7.3 involve the most aggressive preemption that is conceivable – it
happens whenever L > F and just for this reason. Their structure is thus relatively simple:
the game ends as soon as there is a strict first-mover advantage. Preemption need not be that
severe if there are future continuation equilibria with sufficiently high (expected) payoffs. In
this section, we identify equilibria with least possible preemption and thus entailing the highest
attainable equilibrium payoffs. We focus on the class of payoff-symmetric equilibria, which are
the subgame-perfect equilibria with V ϑ1 = V
ϑ
2 a.s. at any stopping time ϑ ∈ T . These have
clear implications for equilibrium strategies. In competitive games, whereM is throughout the
lowest payoff, equilibrium payoffs are then at most the value of optimally stopping min(L,F ) –
no matter how players mix, possibly using public correlation (Proposition 8.1). This bound
on equilibrium payoffs enables us to identify inevitable preemption points: when the leader
payoff L exceeds any continuation equilibrium payoff. Theorem 8.2 formulates a corresponding
algorithm and establishes the existence of an “optimal” subgame-perfect equilibrium.
It is quite clear that any stopping on {F > L} must induce the lower payoff L if M is not
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better. The basis of our argument is the more subtle result that players also cannot exploit
L > F by mixing in any payoff-symmetric equilibrium, even if they have no time constraint.
Proposition 8.1. Suppose M ≤ min(L,F ). Then, in any payoff-symmetric subgame-perfect
equilibrium and for any ϑ ∈ T and i, j ∈ {1, 2} with i 6= j,
V ϑi
(
Gϑi , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
)
≤ ess sup
τ∈T : τ≥ϑ
E
[
Lτ ∧ Fτ
∣∣Fϑ] =: UL∧F (ϑ),
where it is in fact enough to consider to stopping times τ ≤ inf{t ≥ ϑ |Gϑi (t) ∨G
ϑ
j (t) ≥ 1}.
The proof of Proposition 8.1 in Appendix B.2 is based on the following important facts for
any payoff-symmetric equilibrium (which do not depend on the assumption M ≤ min(L,F ),
yet): First, the conditional stopping probabilities of the players must be the same on {F 6= L}
(Lemma B.2), because a player who stops with a higher conditional probability also becomes
leader with a higher conditional probability, whereas the other becomes follower on that event.
As one consequence, Gϑ1 and G
ϑ
2 must then even be identical before they put any mass on
{F = L} (Lemma B.3). Moreover, on {F 6= L}, there can only be simultaneous jumps, and
these are only possible when M ≥ F or when preemption occurs with L ≥ F > M . Most
importantly, there cannot be any jumps when F > max(L,M). Finally, the local payoff from
any terminal jump is bounded by max(F,M) (Lemma B.4).
The intuition for Proposition 8.1 is now the following. In equilibrium, player i must be
willing to wait until any time at which still Gϑi < 1 and to stop only from there on with the
corresponding conditional probabilities. Consider as such a time the first one at which any
player puts some mass on {F ≥ L}; call it τ˜ . By waiting until τ˜ , player i might become
follower before if Gϑj increases, and then on {F < L}. At τ˜ , at least one player is willing to
stop by definition. The corresponding (symmetric) local payoff is clearly Lτ˜ ≤ Fτ˜ when G
ϑ
1 ,
Gϑ2 are continuous. A jump can only occur if indeed Fτ˜ = Lτ˜ , which is also the maximal local
payoff (with the hypothesis M ≤ min(L,F ), we cannot have any jump when Fτ˜ > Lτ˜ as we
have seen). Finally, it may happen that Gϑi is exhausted on {F < L}, before ever reaching
τ˜ . Then, however, we must have Gϑ1 = G
ϑ
2 . If they jump to one, the terminal payoff is at
most F < L; if they approach one continuously, this means eventually becoming follower on
{F < L} for sure. In summary, player i never receives more than min(L,F ) when stopping
occurs.
Proposition 8.1 implies that whenever Lϑ > UL∧F (ϑ), we must have G
ϑ
1 (ϑ) ∨ G
ϑ
2 (ϑ) = 1
by preemption.41 If there are any such preemption points in the future, they also restrict
the feasible stopping times τ to maximize the expected value of min(L,F ) in Proposition 8.1,
41This argument is not impaired by any jump ∆Gϑj (ϑ) ∈ (0, 1) due to which player i could not realize Lϑ.
L is right-continuous, so player i could try to stop right after ϑ. The formal argument is given in the proof of
Theorem 8.2.
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which even further reduces the maximally attainable equilibrium payoff. By iteration, we can
identify when preemption is inevitable.
Theorem 8.2. Suppose M ≤ min(L,F ). Then there exists a payoff-symmetric subgame-
perfect equilibrium with maximal payoffs within this class. For any ϑ ∈ T , these are
V ϑ1
(
Gϑ1 , α
ϑ
1 , G
ϑ
2 , α
ϑ
2
)
= V ϑ2
(
Gϑ2 , α
ϑ
2 , G
ϑ
1 , α
ϑ
1
)
= ess sup
τ∈T : τ∈[ϑ,τ˜(ϑ)]
E
[
Lτ ∧ Fτ
∣∣Fϑ] =: U(L∧F )τ˜(ϑ)(ϑ),
where τ˜(ϑ) is the latest sustainable preemption point after ϑ determined by the following
algorithm:
(i) Set τ0(ϑ) := inf{t ≥ ϑ |Lt > UL∧F (t)} and
(L ∧ F )τ0(ϑ) :=
(
Lt∧τ0(ϑ) ∧ Ft∧τ0(ϑ)
)
t≥0
with Snell envelope U(L∧F )τ0(ϑ) := (ess supt≤τ∈T E[(L ∧ F )
τ0(ϑ)
τ |Ft])t≥0.
(ii) For every n ∈ N, set τn(ϑ) := inf{t ≥ ϑ |Lt > U(L∧F )τn−1(ϑ)(t)} ∧ τn−1(ϑ) and
(L ∧ F )τn(ϑ) :=
(
Lt∧τn(ϑ) ∧ Ft∧τn(ϑ)
)
t≥0
with Snell envelope U(L∧F )τn(ϑ) = (ess supt≤τ∈T E[(L ∧ F )
τn(ϑ)
τ |Ft])t≥0.
(iii) Take the monotone limit τ˜(ϑ) := limn→∞ τn(ϑ).
Proof: In Appendix B.3.
The payoff-maximal equilibrium is implemented using the strategies of Theorem 7.3, but
setting αϑi = 0 before τ˜(ϑ). Constructing τ˜(ϑ) by the algorithm is technically not difficult.
The main problem is rather to verify the claimed equilibrium properties: to make sure that
there is no preemption incentive when L > F on [ϑ, τ˜ (ϑ)), that τ˜(ϑ) is indeed maximal, and
that there is a continuation equilibrium of preemption at τ˜(ϑ). Furthermore, measurability
is a major technical issue, since we want to have a time-consistent version of the strategies
where we set αϑi = 0 on [ϑ, τ˜ (ϑ)) for all ϑ ∈ T to achieve the maximal payoff in all subgames.
In order to suppress preemption when Lϑ > Fϑ, it is obviously not sufficient that there
exist τ ≥ ϑ such that E[Lτ ∧ Fτ |Fϑ] ≥ Lϑ; this relation then rather has to hold on all of
[ϑ, τ ] ∩ {L > F}. For instance, the algorithm of Theorem 8.2 can be applied to the model of
Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) by visual inspection, shown in Figure 1.
L exceeds the future maximum of min(L,F ) for the first time at τ0, whence there will be
preemption. Taking that into account, at most the maximum of min(L,F ) up to τ0 might be
achieved. However, L will also exceed this reduced value, at τ1. In the limit, τ˜(0) = T1 is
the first inevitable preemption point. Fudenberg and Tirole also consider another, Case B, in
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tL
F
M
L,F ,M
T1
τ1 τ0
Tˆ2
Figure 1: Preemption, Fudenberg and Tirole (1985)
which the peak at Tˆ2 is higher than first one. Then τ˜(0) = ∞, because L = F at and from
their global peak onwards, and the players can coordinate on joint late adoption. In general,
we may have much more complex stochastic patterns, of course, with arbitrary regions of first-
and second-mover advantages, that may trigger preemption or not.
9 Conclusion
In many timing games, mixed strategies play an important role as we have argued, either for
equilibrium existence or for resolving any strategic conflicts (about roles with differing ameni-
ties) within the game. Having analysed the two different kinds of local strategic incentives, we
have been able to prove existence of subgame-perfect equilibria for general symmetric stochas-
tic timing games and to characterize them quite explicitly, providing symmetric equilibrium
payoffs. Our approach is based on the general theory of optimal stopping and demonstrates
which kinds of stopping problems need to be solved to verify equilibria; not only, but in
particular for mixed strategies.
There are possibly different equilibria for a given timing game, with varying degrees of
preemption. We have considered the two extreme cases: If one initiates preemption when-
ever there is a first-mover advantage, then payoffs may be severely restricted. However, we
have shown how to reduce preemption to a minimum and proved existence of correspond-
ing equilibria with maximal attainable payoffs. If preemption can indeed be prevented in a
certain regime with first-mover advantage (by sufficiently profitable future continuation equi-
libria), then there may also exist further equilibria with continuous mixing, which we have
only employed for second-mover advantages. Nevertheless, any such additional mixing will be
inefficient and induce lower payoffs (which one can also show directly).
A more specific strategic investment model with random first- and second-mover advan-
tages is analysed in Steg and Thijssen (2015), where the strategies corresponding to the ones
derived here have Markovian representations.
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A Technical results
Lemma A.1. If L is a (measurable) process of class (D), then there exists a constant K ∈ R+
such that for any process G which is a.s. right-continuous, nondecreasing, nonnegative and
bounded by some G∞ ∈ L
∞(P ) and for any [0,∞]-valued random variables a, b it holds that
(i) E
[∫
[a,b)
|Lt| dGt
]
≤ K‖G∞‖∞ <∞ and
(ii)
∫
[a,b)
|Lt| dGt =
∫ ∞
0
∣∣∣LτG(x)∣∣∣1{τG(x)∈[a,b)} dx <∞ a.s.,
where τG(x) := inf{t ≥ 0 |Gt ≥ x} for any x ∈ R+, and ∆G0 := G0. The same holds if τ
G(x)
is instead defined with “Gt > x”.
If the bound on G is only integrable, i.e., G∞ ∈ L
1(P ), but {|Lτ |1{τ<∞} | τ ∈ T } bounded
in L∞(P ) by K ∈ R+, then (i) holds with KE[G∞] instead and (ii) as stated.
Proof. The a.s. nondecreasing family of stopping times (τG(x))x∈R+ is the left-continuous
inverse of G, which satisfies
τG(x) ≤ t ⇔ Gt ≥ x.
Thus, with the convention
∫
[0,c] dG = Gc, we have a.s.
∫
[0,∞) 1A dG =
∫∞
0 1{τG(x)∈A} dx for all
A ∈ {[0, c] | c ∈ R+} and also for A = R+ by monotone convergence. The relation extends to
all Borel sets A from R+ by a monotone class argument.
42 As L·(ω) : R+ → R, t 7→ Lt(ω),
is Borel measurable43 like the function 1{t∈[a(ω),b(ω))} , we thus obtain the change-of-variable
formula44
∫
[a,b)
|Lt| dGt =
∫
{τG(x)<∞}
∣∣∣LτG(x)∣∣∣1{τG(x)∈[a,b)} dx =
∫ ∞
0
∣∣∣LτG(x)∣∣∣1{τG(x)∈[a,b)} dx a.s.
The formula also holds with inf{t ≥ 0 |Gt > x} = τ
G(x+) instead of τG(x) because the two
can only differ on a set of Lebesgue measure (dx) zero. By Fubini’s Theorem,
E
[∫ ∞
0
∣∣∣LτG(x)∣∣∣1{τG(x)∈[a,b)} dx
]
≤
∫ ∞
0
E
[∣∣∣LτG(x)∣∣∣1{τG(x)<∞}] dx
=
∫ ‖G∞‖∞
0
E
[∣∣∣LτG(x)∣∣∣1{τG(x)<∞}] dx. (A.1)
As L is of class (D), {|Lτ |1{τ<∞} | τ ∈ T } is bounded in L
1(P ) by some K < ∞, whence
(A.1) is bounded by K‖G∞‖∞ if the latter is finite. If ‖Lτ1{τ<∞}‖∞ ≤ K for every τ ∈ T
42See, e.g., Kallenberg (2002), Theorem 1.1.
43See, e.g., Kallenberg (2002), Lemma 1.26 (i).
44See, e.g., Kallenberg (2002), Lemma 1.22. It is necessary to restrict dx to {τG(x) <∞}, which is redundant
when integrating over [a, b).
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and G is bounded by G∞ ∈ L
1(P ), then (A.1) is bounded by
∫ ∞
0
E
[
K1{τG(x)<∞}
]
dx = KE
[∫ ∞
0
1{τG(x)<∞} dx
]
≤ KE[G∞] <∞.
In either case it follows that
∫
[a,b) |Lt| dGt <∞ a.s.
Lemma A.2. Suppose the processes L, F , and M are optional and of class (D), and the
adapted process G is right-continuous, nondecreasing and taking values in [0, 1] a.s. Then S
defined by
St :=
∫
[0,t)
Fs dGs +∆GtMt +
(
1−Gt
)
Lt, t ∈ R+,
is optional and of class (D) as well. Moreover, if additionally M∞ ∈ L
1(P ) and G∞ ≡ 1 are
defined, and correspondingly S∞ by setting t =∞, then also S∞ ∈ L
1(P ).
Proof. The components of S are obviously optional, in particular the integral being a left-
continuous and ∆G the difference of a right-continuous and a left-continuous adapted process.
To show that S is of class (D) under the hypothesis, and also that S∞ ∈ L
1(P ), it is clearly
enough to verify that {
∫
[0,τ) F dG | τ ∈ T } is uniformly integrable. By the Theorem of de la
Vallée-Poussin, a family of random variables {Xτ | τ ∈ T } is uniformly integrable if and only
if there exists a nondecreasing and convex function g : R+ → R+ such that limt→∞
g(t)
t
= ∞
and supτ∈T E[g(|Xτ |)] < ∞. This holds by hypothesis for {Fτ1{τ<∞} | τ ∈ T }; cf. fn. 10.
Fix this g associated to F . By a change of variable as in Lemma A.1 then
sup
τ∈T
E
[
g
(∣∣∣∣
∫
[0,τ)
Fs dGs
∣∣∣∣
)]
≤ sup
τ∈T
E
[
g
(∫ 1
0
∣∣∣FτG(x)1{τG(x)<τ}∣∣∣ dx
)]
≤ sup
τ∈T
E
[∫ 1
0
g
(∣∣∣FτG(x)1{τG(x)<∞}∣∣∣) dx
]
≤
∫ 1
0
sup
τ∈T
E
[
g
(∣∣∣Fτ1{τ<∞}∣∣∣)] dx <∞.
For the last two inequalities, we resp. used Jensen’s inequality and Fubini’s Theorem.
Lemma A.3. Consider two stopping times σ ≤ τ and an event C ∈ Fσ. Then
ϑ := σ1C + τ1Cc
is a stopping time. If the filtration is complete, it suffices that σ ≤ τ a.s.
Proof. To verify that ϑ is a stopping time, we check whether {ϑ ≤ t} ∈ Ft for all t ∈ R+.
First note that
{ϑ ≤ t} = ({σ ≤ t} ∩ C) ∪ ({τ ≤ t} ∩ Cc).
The first intersection belongs to Ft by definition of Fσ, and so also the complement ({σ ≤
t} ∩ C)c = {σ > t} ∪ Cc ∈ Ft, implying C
c ∩ {σ ≤ t} ∈ Ft. Finally, as {τ ≤ t} ∈ Ft, we
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conclude
Cc ∩ {σ ≤ t} ∩ {τ ≤ t} = Cc ∩ {τ ≤ t} ∈ Ft.
If σ ≤ τ only a.s., then the last equality holds up to the nullset Cc ∩{σ > t}∩ {τ ≤ t}, which
is contained in Ft if the filtration is complete.
Lemma A.4. The process L˜τ
ϑ
:= 1{t<τϑ}L + 1{t≥τϑ}max(Fτϑ ,Mτϑ) defined in Theorem
5.1 is upper-semi-continuous from the left in expectation on [ϑ,∞], on which DL˜ is hence
left-continuous a.s.
Proof. Let (τn)n∈N be a sequence of stopping times that is a.s. increasing and taking values
in [ϑ,∞], and denote the limit by τ ∈ T . Define the measurable set
A :=
⋂
n
{τn < τ
ϑ}.
Then limn→∞ L˜τn = L˜τ a.s. on A
c, implying limn→∞E[1AcL˜τn ] = E[1AcL˜τ ] as L˜ is of class
(D). We obtain the analogue for L∧F if we use (τn∧τ
ϑ) and (τ ∧τϑ), respectively. Combining
the latter fact with upper-semi-continuity from the left in expectation given by Assumption
2.1 (iii) yields
lim sup
n∈N
E
[
1A(L ∧ F )τn∧τϑ + 1Ac(L ∧ F )τn∧τϑ
]
≤ E
[
1A(L ∧ F )τ∧τϑ + 1Ac(L ∧ F )τ∧τϑ
]
⇒ lim sup
n∈N
E
[
1A(L ∧ F )τn
]
≤ E
[
1A(L ∧ F )τ
]
.
Note that (L ∧ F )τn = L˜τn on A and (L ∧ F )τ ≤ L˜τ on A ⊆ {τ ≤ τ
ϑ}, implying the first
claim.
Finally, we show that if L˜ is upper-semi-continuous from the left in expectation on an
interval [ϑ,∞], then the paths of DL˜ are left-continuous on that interval, a.s. Define the
auxiliary process Lˆ by Lˆt := 1{t<ϑ}Mˆt + 1{t≥ϑ}L˜t, where Mˆ is a right-continuous version of
the martingale (E[L˜ϑ |Ft])t≥0, which is uniformly integrable and thus (left-) continuous in
expectation thanks to optional sampling. Lˆ inherits upper-semi-continuity from the left in
expectation because E[Lˆτn ] = E[1{τn<ϑ}L˜ϑ + 1{τn≥ϑ}L˜τn ] = E[L˜τn∨ϑ] and similarly E[Lˆτ ] =
E[L˜τ∨ϑ]. As L˜ and Lˆ agree on [ϑ,∞], their Snell envelopes UL˜ and ULˆ agree at any stopping
time in that interval and thus UL˜1{t≥ϑ} and ULˆ1{t≥ϑ} are indistinguishable by the uniqueness
of optional projections. The same holds for the compensators DL˜ and DLˆ on [ϑ,∞] by
uniqueness of the Doob-Meyer-decomposition. D
Lˆ
is left-continuous a.s. because Lˆ is upper-
semi-continuous from the left in expectation, see fn. 28.
Lemma A.5. Let A,B : R+ → R ∪ {+∞} be two right-continuous, nondecreasing functions
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with 0 ≤ ∆B ≤ 1. Then the differential equation
dG = (1−G) dA, G0− = a ∈ R (A.2)
has the solution
G = 1− (1− a)e−
∫
dAc ∏(1 + ∆A)−1 = 1− (1− a)e− ∫ dAc−∑ ln(1+∆A),
where Ac = A−
∑
∆A ∈ [A0, A] is the continuous part of A, and the differential equation
dG = (1−G−) dB, G0− = b ∈ R (A.3)
has the solution
G = 1− (1− b)e−
∫
dBc ∏(1−∆B) = 1− (1− b)e− ∫ dBc+∑ ln(1−∆B).
Any solution to (A.2) or (A.3) is monotone towards, but never crossing, one. G solves both
equations if and only if ∆A = ∆B1−∆B , resp. ∆B =
∆A
1+∆A .
Proof. Straightforward to check. Note that dG0 =
(1−a) dA0
1+∆A0
for any solution of (A.2), implying
both monotonicity on either side of one and that this value cannot be crossed. Indeed,
G0 ≷ 1⇔ ∆G0 ≷ 1−G0− = 1− a⇔ 0 ≷ 1− a.
Similarly, dG0 = (1 − b) dB0 for any solution of (A.3), implying G0 ≷ 1 ⇔ ∆G0 ≷
1−G0− = 1− b⇔ 0 ≷ 1− b and ∆B0 < 1, using ∆B0 ∈ [0, 1] for the last equivalence.
Lemma A.6. Let (Yt, Zt)t∈[0,1] be a family of random variables. Assume that the family (Yt)
is uniformly integrable and that (Zt) is bounded in L
∞(P ), and Zt → 0 in probability as t→ 1.
Then
lim
t→1
E[YtZt] = 0.
Proof. (‖Zt‖∞) is bounded by a constant K, hence (Zt) is uniformly integrable and converges
to the constant zero also in L1(P ) as t → 1. As (Yt) is uniformly integrable, we can find for
any ε > 0 a suitable constant Kε ≥ 0 such that
E
[
1{|Yt|≥Kε} |YtZt|
]
≤ εK for all t ∈ [0, 1].
In combination,
lim sup
t→1
E
[
|YtZt|
]
= lim sup
t→1
(
E
[
1{|Yt|≥Kε} |YtZt|
]
+ E
[
1{|Yt|<Kε} |YtZt|
])
≤ lim sup
t→1
E
[
1{|Yt|≥Kε} |YtZt|
]
+ lim
t→1
E
[
1{|Yt|<Kε} |YtZt|
]
≤ εK
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and the claim follows.
B Proofs
B.1 Proofs for results in Sections 3–7
Proof of Lemma 3.1. Define the right-continuous inverse of Gϑi by the stopping times
τG,ϑi (x) := inf{t ≥ ϑ |G
ϑ
i (t) > x}, x ∈ [0, 1). Then Lemma A.1 allows the change of variable
∫
[ϑ,∞)
Sϑi (t) dG
ϑ
i (t) =
∫ 1
0
Sϑi
(
τG,ϑi (x)
)
1
{τG,ϑ
i
(x)<∞}
dx a.s.
Moreover, x > Gϑi (∞−)⇒ τ
G,ϑ
i (x) =∞⇒ x ≥ G
ϑ
i (∞−), i.e., 1{x>Gϑ
i
(∞−)} ≤ 1{τG,ϑ
i
(x)=∞}
≤
1{x≥Gϑ
i
(∞−)} for all x ∈ [0, 1) a.s., implying
∆Gϑi (∞)S
ϑ
i (∞) =
(∫ 1
0
1
{τG,ϑ
i
(x)=∞}
dx
)
Sϑi (∞) a.s.
Therefore,
V ϑi
(
Gϑi , G
ϑ
j
)
= E
[∫ 1
0
Sϑi
(
τG,ϑi (x)
)
1
{τG,ϑ
i
(x)<∞}
dx+
∫ 1
0
Sϑi (∞)1{τG,ϑ
i
(x)=∞}
dx
∣∣∣∣Fϑ
]
= E
[∫ 1
0
Sϑi
(
τG,ϑi (x)
)
dx
∣∣∣∣Fϑ
]
. (B.1)
Let A denote the event that (B.1) exceeds ess supx∈[0,1)E[S
ϑ
i (τ
G,ϑ
i (x)) |Fϑ] =: Z
ϑ
i and suppose
by way of contradiction P [A] > 0. Then E[1A
∫ 1
0 S
ϑ
i (τ
G,ϑ
i (x)) dx] > E[1AZ
ϑ
i ] by A ∈ Fϑ and
iterated expectations, so
∫ 1
0 E[1AS
ϑ
i (τ
G,ϑ
i (x))] dx > E[1AZ
ϑ
i ] by Fubini’s Theorem. There
would thus exist x ∈ (0, 1) with E[1AZ
ϑ
i ] < E[1AS
ϑ
i (τ
G,ϑ
i (x))] = E[1AE[S
ϑ
i (τ
G,ϑ
i (x)) |Fϑ]],
which contradicts Zϑi ≥ E[S
ϑ
i (τ
G,ϑ
i (x)) |Fϑ]. So, V
ϑ
i (G
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j ) ≤ Z
ϑ
i a.s., implying (3.3).
Given the latter and denoting its right-hand side by UϑSi , it is a.s. binding if and only if
E[V ϑi (G
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j )] = E[U
ϑ
Si
], i.e., by (B.1) and Fubini, if and only if
∫ 1
0 E[S
ϑ
i (τ
G,ϑ
i (x))] dx =
E[UϑSi ], resp. S
ϑ
i (τ
G,ϑ
i (x)) = U
ϑ
Si
a.s. for a.e. x ∈ [0, 1).
If Gϑi is extended by any feasible α
ϑ
i instead of the trivial α
∞ given by 1{t≥∞}, then it is
easy to check from Definitions 2.5 and C.1 that
V ϑi
(
Gϑi , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
∞)− V ϑi (Gϑi , α∞, Gϑj , α∞)
= E
[
1{τˆϑ
i
<∞}∆G
ϑ
i
(
τˆϑi
)
∆Gϑj
(
τˆϑi
)(
1− αϑi
(
τˆϑi
))(
Fτˆϑ
i
−Mτˆϑ
i
)∣∣∣Fϑ]
with τˆϑi = inf{t ≥ 0 |α
ϑ
i (t) > 0}, so G
ϑ
i (τˆ
ϑ
i ) = 1. Let B = {1{τˆϑ
i
<∞}∆G
ϑ
j (τˆ
ϑ
i )(Fτˆϑ
i
−Mτˆϑ
i
) >
0}, so B ∈ Fτˆϑ
i
, and define Gϑn for any n ∈ N \ {1, 2} by delaying ∆G
ϑ
i (τˆ
ϑ
i ) to τˆ
ϑ
i + n
−1 on
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B, i.e., by Gϑn(t) = G
ϑ
i (t)1{t<τˆϑ
i
} + (G
ϑ
i (τˆ
ϑ
i −)1B + 1Bc)1{t−τˆϑ
i
∈[0,n−1)} + 1{t≥τˆϑ
i
+n−1}. Then
(Gϑn, α
∞) is a feasible (standard) mixed strategy for ϑ. Let furthermore C ∈ Fϑ. By right-
continuity of L and Gϑj , S
ϑ
i (t+)− S
ϑ
i (t) = ∆G
ϑ
j (t)(Ft −Mt). As S
ϑ
i is of class (D), we obtain
the limit in expectation
lim
n→∞
E
[
1C
(
V ϑi
(
Gϑn, α
∞, Gϑj , α
∞)− V ϑi (Gϑi , α∞, Gϑj , α∞))]
= lim
n→∞
E
[
1C
(∫
[0,∞]
Sϑi (t)dG
ϑ
n(t)−
∫
[0,∞]
Sϑi (t)dG
ϑ
i (t)
)]
= E
[
1C
(
Sϑi (τˆ
ϑ
i +)− S
ϑ
i (τˆ
ϑ
i )
)
1B∆G
ϑ
i (τˆ
ϑ
i )
]
= E
[
1C∆G
ϑ
j
(
τˆϑi
)(
Fτˆϑ
i
−Mτˆϑ
i
)
1B∆G
ϑ
i
(
τˆϑi
)]
≥ E
[
1C
(
V ϑi
(
Gϑi , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
∞)− V ϑi (Gϑi , α∞, Gϑj , α∞))].
Together with (3.3) for all pairs (Gϑn, G
ϑ
j ), this shows that C = {V
ϑ
i (G
ϑ
i , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
∞) >
ess supτ≥ϑE[S
ϑ
i (τ) |Fϑ]} must have probability zero.
Proof of Lemma 4.1. By right-continuity of L and Gϑj , S
ϑ
i (τ+) − S
ϑ
i (τ) = ∆G
ϑ
j (τ)(Fτ −
Mτ ) ≥ 0 for any τ ∈ T . Now consider the set {τi < τ
∗
L(ϑ)}, on which a.s.
E
[
Sϑi
(
τ∗L(ϑ)+
)
− Sϑi
(
τi
) ∣∣∣Fτi]
= E
[∫
[τi,τ∗L(ϑ)]
Fs dG
ϑ
j (s) +
(
1−Gϑj
(
τ∗L(ϑ)
))
Lτ∗
L
(ϑ) −∆G
ϑ
j (τi)Mτi −
(
1−Gϑj
(
τi
))
Lτi
∣∣∣∣Fτi
]
≥ E
[
Fτ∗
L
(ϑ)
(
Gϑj
(
τ∗L(ϑ)
)
−Gϑj
(
τi−
))
+
(
1−Gϑj
(
τ∗L(ϑ)
))
Lτ∗
L
(ϑ) −
(
1−Gϑj
(
τi−
))
Lτi
∣∣∣Fτi]
≥ E
[
Lτ∗
L
(ϑ)
(
1−Gϑj
(
τi−
))
−
(
1−Gϑj
(
τi−
))
Lτi
∣∣∣Fτi] ≥ 0.
The first inequality is obtained from a change of variable exploiting that F is a supermartingale
(demonstrated at the end of the proof), and from L ≥ M . The second inequality is due to
F ≥ L and the last one to the optimality of τ∗L(ϑ). Note that the latter will be strict if P [τ
i <
τ∗L(ϑ) and G
ϑ
j (τi−) < 1] > 0, by suboptimality of any ϑ ≤ τi < τ
∗
L(ϑ). The second estimate
in Lemma 4.1 follows from setting τi = ϑ in the previous steps. The next claim is due to
iterated expectations at τ∗L(ϑ) ≥ ϑ and E[S
ϑ
i (τi+) |Fτ∗L(ϑ)] ≤ ess supτ≥τ∗L(ϑ)
E[Sϑi (τ) |Fτ∗L(ϑ)]
for any stopping time τi ≥ τ
∗
L(ϑ). Indeed, let A ∈ Fτ∗L(ϑ) be the event that the latter
fails for given τi and consider the stopping times τi + n
−1, n ∈ N. As Sϑi is of class (D),
E[1AS
ϑ
i (τi+)] = limn→∞E[1AS
ϑ
i (τi+n
−1)] ≤ E[1A ess supτ≥τ∗
L
(ϑ)E[S
ϑ
i (τ) |Fτ∗L(ϑ)]], showing
that A has probability zero. Finally, the previous and following steps go through identically
with τ∗L(ϑ) replaced by τ
∗∗
L (ϑ).
The announced change of variable argument similar to the proof of Lemma 3.1 is that
E
[
Fτ∗
L
(ϑ)
(
Gϑj
(
τ∗L(ϑ)
)
−Gϑj
(
τi−
))∣∣∣Fτi]− E
[∫
[τi,τ∗L(ϑ)]
Fs dG
ϑ
j (s)
∣∣∣∣Fτi
]
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= E
[∫ 1
0
(
Fτ∗
L
(ϑ) − FτG,ϑ
j
(x)
)
1
{τG,ϑ
j
(x)∈[τi,τ∗L(ϑ)]}
dx
∣∣∣∣Fτi
]
cannot exceed ess supτ≥τi E[(Fτ∗L(ϑ) − Fτ )1{τ∈[τi,τ
∗
L
(ϑ)]} |Fτi ]. This is nonpositive by iterated
expectations at τ , with E[(Fτ∗
L
(ϑ)−Fτ ) |Fτ ] ≤ 0 on {τ ≤ τ
∗
L(ϑ)} as F is a supermartingale.
Proof of Proposition 4.2. Let ϑ ∈ T and C ∈ Fτ∗
L
(ϑ). Then τ
∗
1 , τ
∗
2 as hypothesized are
stopping times thanks to Lemma A.3 by τ∗L(ϑ) ≤ τF (ϑ) a.s. To verify the optimality of τ
∗
1 , it
suffices by Lemmas 3.1 and 4.1 to consider stopping Sϑ1 from τ
∗
L(ϑ) on. On C, S
ϑ
1 (t) = Lt∧τF (ϑ)
for all t ≥ τ∗L(ϑ), such that stopping immediately at τ
∗
L(ϑ) is optimal by its optimality for
L. On Cc, Sϑ1 (t) = Fτ∗L(ϑ) ≥ Mτ
∗
L
(ϑ) for all t > τ
∗
L(ϑ), with equality on {τF (ϑ) = τ
∗
L(ϑ)} by
hypothesis. Hence, τF (ϑ) is optimal on C
c. The same argument applies to τ∗2 , swapping C
and Cc.
We can use τF (ϑ) := inf{t ≥ ϑ |Ft = Mt} because then τF (ϑ) ≥ τ
∗
L(ϑ) a.s. Indeed, as F
is a supermartingale dominating L, it also dominates the Snell envelope UL. Therefore, at
τF (ϑ), F = M (by right-continuity) implies that F ≥ UL ≥ L ≥ M must bind throughout.
Hence, τF (ϑ) ≥ inf{t ≥ ϑ |UL(t) = Lt} = τ
∗
L(ϑ).
Proof of Theorem 5.1. Let ϑ, τϑ ∈ T be as hypothesized. As they remain fixed, we may
suppress them as superscripts (except from τϑ) in this proof to ease readability. L˜ is right-
continuous a.s. and of class (D), so it has a Snell envelope UL˜ with an integrable and predictable
compensatorDL˜. On [ϑ,∞], L˜ is upper-semi-continuous from the left in expectation, and then
DL˜ is a.s. continuous; see Lemma A.4 and cf. fn.s 28, 29.
Let now Gi, Gj resp. be given by (5.1), (5.2). Gi represents a standard mixed strategy:
it is adapted as τi ∈ T , and it is a.s. right-continuous, nondecreasing, has Gi(t) = 0 for
t ∈ [0, ϑ), and Gi(∞) = 1. It can only jump at τi ≤ τ
ϑ: 1{F>L}(F − L)
−1 can be understood
as a Radon-Nikodym derivative, such that the integral defines a measure on R+ which is
absolutely continuous w.r.t. the (finite) atomless measure dDL˜.
45 Gj is even continuous on
[ϑ, τϑ).
To prove that the standard mixed strategy represented by Gj is a best reply to Gi (even
among extended mixed strategies), it suffices by Lemma 3.1 and its proof to show that for
some random variable Z¯j and every stopping time τ ≥ ϑ we have
E
[
Sj(τ)
∣∣∣Fϑ] ≤ E[Z¯j ∣∣∣Fϑ], (B.2)
with equality if dGj(τ) > 0. Indeed, then ess supτ≥ϑE[Sj(τ) |Fϑ] ≤ E[Z¯j |Fϑ], and by
the equalities, it then holds in the argument following (B.1) that E[Sj(τ
G,ϑ
j (x)) |Fϑ] =
E[Z¯j |Fϑ] =: Zj for all x ∈ [0, 1), so it also applies with all inequalities reversed (except
P [A] > 0), hence showing that Vj(Gj , Gi) = Zj = E[Z¯j |Fϑ].
45The new measure is also σ-finite as {F > L} =
⋃
n∈N
{F − L ≥ 1
n
}.
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To establish (B.2), consider an arbitrary stopping time τ ≥ ϑ. Suppose first also τ ≤ τi. On
[ϑ, τi), Gi satisfies dGi = (1−Gi)(F −L)
−11{F>L} dDL˜ by construction, and 1{F≤L} dDL˜ = 0
by definition of τi. Hence,∫
[ϑ,τ)
(F − L) dGi =
∫
[ϑ,τ)
(1−Gi)1{F>L} dDL˜ =
∫
[ϑ,τ)
(1−Gi) dDL˜ a.s., (B.3)
where
∫
LdGi is well defined by Lemma A.1 and L of class (D). Applying integration by parts
to the right-hand side (adjusting for [ϑ, τ) closed on the left, open on the right, and recalling
that DL˜ is continuous) yields∫
[ϑ,τ)
(1−Gi) dDL˜ =
∫
[ϑ,τ)
DL˜ dGi +
(
1−Gi(τ−)
)
DL˜(τ)−
(
1−Gi(ϑ−)
)
DL˜(ϑ). (B.4)
Using (B.3), (B.4), and Gi(ϑ−) = 0, now
Sj(τ) =
∫
[ϑ,τ)
F dGi +∆Gi(τ)Mτ +
(
1−Gi(τ)
)
Lτ
=
∫
[ϑ,τ)
(
L+DL˜
)
dGi +∆Gi(τ)
(
Mτ +DL˜(τ)
)
+
(
1−Gi(τ)
)(
Lτ +DL˜(τ)
)
−DL˜(ϑ).
Next, as the martingale componentML˜ of the Snell envelope is uniformly integrable,
∫
ML˜ dGi
is well defined by Lemma A.1, and we can make the change of variable to show that
E
[∫
[ϑ,τ)
ML˜ dGi
∣∣∣∣Fϑ
]
= E
[
ML˜(τ)
(
Gi(τ−)−Gi(ϑ−)
) ∣∣∣Fϑ]
= − E
[
ML˜(τ)
(
1−Gi(τ−)
) ∣∣∣Fϑ]+ML˜(ϑ)(1−Gi(ϑ−))
as ML˜ is a martingale. Indeed, similarly as in the proof of Lemma 3.1,
E
[∫
[ϑ,τ)
ML˜(t) dGi(t)
∣∣∣∣Fϑ
]
− E
[
ML˜(τ)
(
Gi(τ−)−Gi(ϑ−)
) ∣∣∣Fϑ]
= E
[∫ 1
0
(
ML˜
(
τGi (x)
)
−ML˜(τ)
)
1{τG
i
(x)∈[ϑ,τ)} dx
∣∣∣∣Fϑ
]
cannot exceed ess supτ ′≥ϑE[(ML˜(τ
′)−ML˜(τ))1{τ ′∈[ϑ,τ)} |Fϑ], which is zero by iterated expec-
tations at τ ′, with E[(ML˜(τ
′)−ML˜(τ)) |Fτ ′ ] = 0 on {τ
′ < τ} due to the martingale property.
Switching sign then yields the previously claimed identity.
Combining the last two results with Gi(ϑ−) = 0,
E
[
Sj(τ)
∣∣Fϑ] = E
[∫
[ϑ,τ)
(
L+DL˜ −ML˜
)
dGi +∆Gi(τ)
(
Mτ +DL˜(τ)−ML˜(τ)
)
(B.5)
+
(
1−Gi(τ)
)(
Lτ +DL˜(τ)−ML˜(τ)
) ∣∣∣∣Fϑ
]
−DL˜(ϑ) +ML˜(ϑ).
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On [ϑ, τ), L + DL˜ − ML˜ = L˜ − UL˜ by τ ≤ τi ≤ τ
ϑ, and thus the integral vanishes.
Indeed, dGi is absolutely continuous w.r.t. dDL˜ on [ϑ, τi), and
∫
(UL˜ − L˜) dDL˜ = 0; cf. (3.7).
Furthermore, ∆Gi(τ) = 0 on {τ < τi} and UL˜(τ) = L˜τ on {τ = τi}. Specifically, on
{τi < τ
ϑ}, their definition implies 1{F=L}dDL˜ > 0 at τi, so UL˜(τi) = L˜τi = Lτi = Fτi ; cf.
(3.6). On {τi = τ
ϑ}, UL˜(τi) = L˜τi as L˜t is constant for t ∈ [τ
ϑ,∞]. Finally, the last term in
the expectation vanishes when τ ≥ τϑ and otherwise has again Lτ = L˜τ . (B.5) thus becomes
E
[
Sj(τ)
∣∣Fϑ] = E[1{τ=τi}∆Gi(τi)(Mτi − L˜τi)+ (1−Gi(τ))(L˜τ − UL˜(τ))
∣∣∣Fϑ]+ UL˜(ϑ)
≤ E
[
1{τ=τi}∆Gi(τi)
(
Mτi − L˜τi
) ∣∣∣Fϑ]+ UL˜(ϑ) (B.6)
by UL˜ ≥ L˜, with equality for τ = τi by UL˜(τi) = L˜τi (resp. for dGj(τ) > 0, as then necessarily
τ = inf{t ≥ τ |DL˜(t) > DL˜(τ)} on {τ < τi}; cf. (3.6) again). We now remove the restriction
τ ≤ τi by an estimate. Sj(t) is constant for t ∈ (τi,∞], with Sj(t) − Sj(τi) = ∆Gi(τi)(Fτi −
Mτi). Hence, Sj(τ) ≤ Sj(τi) +∆Gi(τi)(max(Fτi ,Mτi)−Mτi) on {τ > τi}. This estimate also
holds on {τ = τi}, so for any stopping time τ ≥ ϑ we have, together with (B.6),
E
[
Sj(τ)
∣∣Fϑ] = E[Sj(τ ∧ τi) + 1{τ>τi}∆Gi(τi)(Fτi −Mτi)
∣∣∣Fϑ]
≤ E
[
Sj(τ ∧ τi) + 1{τ≥τi}∆Gi(τi)
(
max(Fτi ,Mτi)−Mτi
) ∣∣∣Fϑ]
≤ E
[
1{τ∧τi=τi}∆Gi(τi)
(
Mτi − L˜τi
)
+ 1{τ≥τi}∆Gi(τi)
(
max(Fτi ,Mτi)−Mτi
) ∣∣∣Fϑ]+ UL˜(ϑ)
= E
[
1{τ≥τi}∆Gi(τi)
(
max(Fτi ,Mτi)− L˜τi
) ∣∣∣Fϑ]+ UL˜(ϑ). (B.7)
Recall that L˜τϑ = max(Fτϑ ,Mτϑ), and as just observed, UL˜(τi) = L˜τi = Lτi = Fτi on
{τi < τ
ϑ}. Therefore, we can summarize (B.7) as
E
[
Sj(τ)
∣∣Fϑ] ≤ E[1{τ≥τi}1{τi<τϑ}∆Gi(τi)(max(Fτi ,Mτi)− Fτi)
∣∣∣Fϑ]+ UL˜(ϑ)
≤ E
[
1{τi<τϑ}∆Gi(τi)
(
max(Fτi ,Mτi)− Fτi
) ∣∣∣Fϑ]+ UL˜(ϑ). (B.8)
This is a τ -independent bound. To construct a stopping time τa ≥ ϑ that attains it, let
C = {∆Gi(τi)(Fτi −Mτi) > 0}, so C ∈ Fτi , and we may define τa = τi on C
c and τa =∞ on
C; cf. Lemma A.3. Note that τi < τa on C by the convention F∞ =M∞. Then
Sj(τa) = Sj(τi) + 1C∆Gi(τi)
(
Fτi −Mτi
)
= Sj(τi) + ∆Gi(τi)
(
max(Fτi ,Mτi)−Mτi
)
Therefore, our estimate on Sj(τ) is binding for τ = τa, and thus also the first inequality in
(B.7). The second is binding because it represents (B.6) for τ = τa ∧ τi = τi. Hence the first
inequality in (B.8) binds, and finally the second by τa ≥ τi. This means that Gj is a best
reply to Gi if and only if Vj(Gj , Gi) = E[
∫
Sj dGj |Fϑ] = E[Sj(τa) |Fϑ].
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To reduce this to the claimed conditions, we can use (B.6)–(B.8) as follows. For all τ ≥ ϑ:
E
[
Sj(τa)
∣∣Fϑ] = E[Sj(τ) + Sj(τa)− Sj(τ ∧ τi)− 1{τ>τi}(Sj(τ)− Sj(τi)) ∣∣Fϑ]
= E
[
Sj(τ) + 1{τi<τϑ}∆Gi(τi)
(
max(Fτi ,Mτi)− Fτi
)
− 1{τ∧τi=τi}∆Gi(τi)
(
Mτi − L˜τi
)
−
(
1−Gi(τ ∧ τi)
)(
L˜τ∧τi − UL˜(τ ∧ τi)
)
− 1{τ>τi}∆Gi(τi)
(
Fτi −Mτi
) ∣∣∣Fϑ].
The left-hand side is independent of τ , so by the argument following (B.1) resp. (B.2) we can
integrate inside the expectation on the right-hand side by dGj(t), replacing τ by t, to obtain
E
[ ∫
[0,∞]
Sj(t) dGj(t) +
∫
[0,∞]
1{τi<τϑ}∆Gi(τi)
(
max(Fτi ,Mτi)− Fτi
)
dGj(t)
−
∫
[0,∞]
1{t∧τi=τi}∆Gi(τi)
(
Mτi − L˜τi
)
dGj(t)−
∫
[0,∞]
(
1−Gi(t ∧ τi)
)(
L˜t∧τi − UL˜(t ∧ τi)
)
dGj(t)
−
∫
[0,∞]
1{t>τi}∆Gi(τi)
(
Fτi −Mτi
)
dGj(t)
∣∣∣∣Fϑ
]
.
The fourth integral vanishes again as dGj is absolutely continuous w.r.t. dDL˜ on [0, τi) and
UL˜(τi) = L˜τi (resp. as (B.6) binds whenever dGj(τ) > 0). Therefore,
E
[
Sj(τa)
∣∣Fϑ]− E
[∫
[0,∞]
Sj(t) dGj(t)
∣∣∣∣Fϑ
]
= E
[
1{τi<τϑ}∆Gi(τi)
(
max(Fτi ,Mτi)− Fτi
)
−
(
1−Gj(τi−)
)
∆Gi(τi)
(
Mτi − L˜τi
)
−
(
1−Gj(τi)
)
∆Gi(τi)
(
Fτi −Mτi
) ∣∣∣Fϑ]
= E
[
1{τi<τϑ}∆Gi(τi)
(
max(Fτi ,Mτi)− Fτi
)
+∆Gj(τi)∆Gi(τ
ϑ)
(
max(Fτϑ ,Mτϑ)−Mτϑ
) ∣∣∣Fϑ],
where the last step follows from Gj(τ
ϑ) = 1, the definition of L˜τϑ , and that on {τi < τ
ϑ},
∆Gj(τi) = 0 and furthermore ∆Gi(τi) > 0 only if L˜τi = Lτi = Fτi . The last expectation
vanishes if and only if both nonnegative terms inside do, i.e., if and only if a.s. ∆Gi(τi)(Mτi −
Fτi) ≤ 0 on {τi < τ
ϑ} and ∆Gi(τ
ϑ)(Mτϑ−Fτϑ) ≥ 0, noting that ∆Gi(τ
ϑ) > 0 implies τi = τ
ϑ
and ∆Gj(τ
ϑ) = ∆Gi(τ
ϑ). In this case, the value of the bound established in (B.8), and thus
of Vj(Gj , Gi) = E[
∫
Sj dGj |Fϑ] = E[Sj(τa) |Fϑ], becomes simply UL˜(ϑ).
The previous arguments are also used to show when Gi is a best reply to Gj , but in two
steps. Gj also satisfies dGj = (1−Gj)(F−L)
−11{F>L} dDL˜ on [ϑ, τi), but possibly Gj(τi) < 1.
However, (B.6) only used UL˜ = L˜ at τi, so we obtain it for switched roles and still τ ≤ τi.
This restriction now has to be removed stepwise, as Si(t) need not be constant for t ∈ (τi,∞]
on {τi < τ
ϑ}. Therefore, analogously to C and τa, let D = {∆Gj(τi)(Fτi −Mτi) > 0} ∈ Fτi
and τb ∈ T satisfy τb = τi on D
c and τb = ∞ else, so τb > τi only on {τi = τ
ϑ} as
otherwise ∆Gj(τi) = 0. Assuming τ ≤ τb a.s., then also τ > τi only on {τi = τ
ϑ}, on
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which Si(t) becomes constant, so the estimate used for Sj(τ) also applies for switched roles,
leading to (B.8) for j and every τ ≤ τb. Now τb attains the bound, which trivially becomes
UL˜(ϑ) by 1{τi<τϑ}∆Gj(τi) = 0. As τb ≥ τi,
∫
[0,∞](·) dGi =
∫
[0,τb]
(·) dGi, and thus Vi(Gi, Gj) =
E[Si(τb) |Fϑ] by switching roles if and only if E[∆Gi(τ
ϑ)∆Gj(τ
ϑ)(max(Fτϑ ,Mτϑ)−Mτϑ) |Fϑ]
vanishes, i.e., if and only if ∆Gi(τ
ϑ)(Mτϑ − Fτϑ) ≥ 0 a.s. Then also Vi(Gi, Gj) = UL˜(ϑ).
To show that E[Si(τb) |Fϑ] ≥ E[Si(τ) |Fϑ] for any τ ≥ ϑ, we now start with τ ≤ τ
ϑ and
then obtain an inequality instead of the second inequality in (B.3), as 1{F>L}(1−Gj) dDL˜ ≤
(1 −Gj) dDL˜ need not bind on {τ > τi}. However, carrying on this inequality, we can apply
all subsequent steps for switched roles and τϑ in place of τi, to arrive at the analogue of (B.8),
showing that in fact E[Si(τ) |Fϑ] ≤ UL˜(ϑ) for every τ ≥ ϑ.
The arguments used for Gj against Gi show that Gi is a best reply to itself if and only if
E
[
1{τi<τϑ}∆Gi(τi)
(
max(Fτi ,Mτi)− Fτi
)
+
(
∆Gi(τi)
)2(
L˜τi −Mτi
) ∣∣∣Fϑ] = 0
⇔ E
[
1{τi<τϑ}∆Gi(τi)
(
(1−∆Gi(τi))(Mτi − Fτi)
+ +
(
∆Gi(τi)
)2
(Fτi −Mτi)
+
∣∣∣Fϑ] = 0,
using that L˜τi = max(Fτϑ ,Mτϑ) on {τi = τ
ϑ} and L˜τi = Lτϑ = Fτϑ on {τi < τ
ϑ} as argued
before. This expectation vanishes if and only if ∆Gi(τi)(Mτi − Fτi) ≥ 0, with equality on
{τi < τ
ϑ} whenever ∆Gi(τi) < 1. Then we can finally represent Vi(Gi, Gi) = E[Sj(τa) |Fϑ]
as
E
[
1{τi<τϑ}1{∆Gi(τi)>0}
(
Mτi − Fτi
) ∣∣∣Fϑ]+ UL˜(ϑ),
where UL˜(ϑ) = E[L˜τ∗∗
L˜
(ϑ) |Fϑ] with τ
∗∗
L˜
(ϑ) = inf{t ≥ ϑ |DL˜(t) > DL˜(ϑ)}; cf. (3.6). Moreover,
τi < τ
ϑ and ∆Gi(τi) = 1 if and only if τi = τ
∗∗
L˜
(ϑ) < τϑ and Lτi = Fτi = L˜τi , so we can
rewrite
Vi(Gi, Gi) = E
[
L˜τ∗∗
L˜
(ϑ) + 1{τ∗∗
L˜
(ϑ)<τϑ}∩{Lτ∗∗
L˜
(ϑ)=Fτ∗∗
L˜
(ϑ)}
(
Mτ∗∗
L˜
(ϑ) − L˜τ∗∗
L˜
(ϑ)
) ∣∣∣Fϑ].
Remark B.1. Theorem 5.1 remains true if L is only upper-semi-continuous from the right
(and the left), but L ≡ M . Then Dτ
ϑ
L˜
will be left-continuous (see fn. 28) and there exists a
feasible mixed strategy Gϑi given by
Gϑi (t) := 1− exp
{
−
∫ t
ϑ
1{Fs>Ls} d(D
τϑ
L˜
)c(s)
Fs − Ls
−
∑
[ϑ,t]
ln
(
1{Fs>Ls}∆D
τϑ
L˜
(s)
Fs − Ls
+ 1
)}
for t ∈ [ϑ, τϑi ), where (D
τϑ
L˜
)c is the continuous part of Dτ
ϑ
L˜
and ∆Dτ
ϑ
L˜
(s) = Dτ
ϑ
L˜
(s+)−Dτ
ϑ
L˜
(s),
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and which then satisfies
dGϑi (t) =
(
1−Gϑi (t)
)1{Ft>Lt} dDτϑL˜ (t+)
Ft − Lt
.
Then the only modifications in the proof are that we put dDL˜( · +) on the right-hand side of
(B.3) and the left-hand side (only!) of (B.4). We do not have right-continuity of UL˜ − L˜, but∫
[ϑ,τ)(UL˜ − L˜) dGi = 0 still holds in (B.5): dGi(·) is absolutely continuous w.r.t. dDL˜(·+) on
[ϑ, τi), for which we can apply a change of variable as in Lemma A.1 with τ
DL˜(x) := inf{t ≥
0 |DL˜(t+) > x}. Then τ
DL˜(x) = t⇔ ∀s > t : DL˜(t−) ≤ x < DL˜(s), implying UL˜ = L˜ a.s. at
τDL˜(x); cf. (3.5). Hence, E[
∫
[0,∞) 1{UL˜>L˜}
dDL˜(+)] =
∫∞
0 E[1{UL˜(τ
D
L˜ (x))>L˜(τ
D
L˜ (x))}
] dx = 0.
Finally, when τ < τϑ and ∆Gi(τ) > 0 in (B.5), then simply UL˜(τ) = L˜τ = Lτ ≡Mτ now, so
it is still enough to consider ∆Gi(τi) in all of the following, where also still ∆Gi(τi) > 0 on
{τi < τ
ϑ} only if UL˜(τi) = L˜τi = Lτi = Fτi .
Proof of Theorem 5.3. We only need to establish time-consistency. If the hypothesis holds,
then {(ϑ ∨ ϑ′) ≤ (τϑ ∧ τϑ
′
)} differs from {(ϑ ∨ ϑ′) ≤ τϑ = τϑ
′
} := A ∈ F(ϑ∨ϑ′) at most by a
nullset. Only this event is relevant for time-consistency, because (ϑ ∨ ϑ′) > (τϑ ∧ τϑ
′
) a.s. on
Ac and there is no restriction when Gϑi ∨G
ϑ′
i = 1. With L˜
τϑ = L˜τ
ϑ′
a.s. on A, also
ess sup
τ ′∈T : τ ′≥τ
E
[
L˜τ
ϑ
(τ ′)
∣∣Fτ ] = ess sup
τ ′∈T : τ ′≥τ
E
[
L˜τ
ϑ′
(τ ′)
∣∣Fτ ] a.s.
on {τ ≥ (ϑ ∨ ϑ′)} ∩ A for any τ ∈ T , implying U τ
ϑ
L˜
1{t≥(ϑ∨ϑ′)} = U
τϑ
′
L˜
1{t≥(ϑ∨ϑ′)} a.s. on
A (i.e., the latter two processes are indistinguishable) by the uniqueness of optional projec-
tions. Correspondingly, Dτ
ϑ
L˜
= Dτ
ϑ′
L˜
on [ϑ ∨ ϑ′,∞] a.s. by the uniqueness of the Doob-Meyer
decomposition.
Time-consistency in the equivalent form (1−Gϑi (t)) = (1−G
ϑ
i (ϑ
′−))(1−Gϑ
′
i (t)) reads for
the given Gϑi as
1{t<τϑ
i
} exp
(
−
∫ t
ϑ
1{F>L} dD
τϑ
L˜
F − L
)
= 1{ϑ′≤τϑ
i
} exp
(
−
∫ ϑ′
ϑ
1{F>L} dD
τϑ
L˜
F − L
)
1
{t<τϑ
′
i
}
exp
(
−
∫ t
ϑ′
1{F>L} dD
τϑ
′
L˜
F − L
)
,
which on A and for t ≥ (ϑ ∨ ϑ′) reduces to the true statement
1{t<τϑ
i
} exp
(
−
∫ t
ϑ
1{F>L} dD
τϑ
L˜
F − L
)
= 1{t<τϑ
i
} exp
(
−
∫ ϑ′
ϑ
1{F>L} dD
τϑ
L˜
F − L
)
exp
(
−
∫ t
ϑ′
1{F>L} dD
τϑ
L˜
F − L
)
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thanks to what we have shown before. The argument for j is analogous.
Proof of Theorem 7.3. Fix i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j, and let the extended mixed strategies be
as described. For any ϑ ∈ T then τϑ ≤ inf{t ≥ ϑ |Lt > Ft} = inf{t ≥ ϑ |α
ϑ
i (t) > 0}, so
αϑi (t) > 0 ⇒ G
ϑ
i (t) = 1 a.s. and the same for j. The other feasibility conditions for G
ϑ
i ,
Gϑj follow from Theorem 5.1, and those for α
ϑ
i , α
ϑ
j are shown in Riedel and Steg (2017) (in
the proof of Proposition 3.1, not using their assumption that ϑ = inf{t ≥ ϑ |Lt > Ft} and
F ≥ M). Time-consistency of the families (Gϑi ;ϑ ∈ T ), (G
ϑ
j ;ϑ ∈ T ) follows from Theorem
5.3, and both (αϑi ;ϑ ∈ T ), (α
ϑ
j ;ϑ ∈ T ) are time-consistent because α
ϑ
i from Proposition 7.1
does not depend on ϑ (except for setting αϑi (t) = 0 for t ∈ [0, ϑ)). Now fix arbitrary ϑ ∈ T .
As τϑ ≤ inf{t ≥ ϑ |αϑi (t) > 0}, in fact α
ϑ
i ≡ α
τϑ
i and so for j, and then it is easy to check
from Definitions 2.5 and C.1 that by time-consistency of Gϑi , G
ϑ
j with G
τϑ
i , G
τϑ
j , resp.,
V ϑi
(
Gϑi , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
)
= E
[∫
[0,τϑ)
(
1−Gϑj
)
LdGϑi +
∫
[0,τϑ)
(
1−Gϑi
)
F dGϑj +
∑
[0,τϑ)
M∆Gϑi ∆G
ϑ
j
+
(
1−Gϑi (τ
ϑ−)
)(
1−Gϑj (τ
ϑ−)
)
V τ
ϑ
i
(
Gτ
ϑ
i , α
τϑ
i , G
τϑ
j , α
τϑ
j
) ∣∣∣∣Fϑ
]
. (B.9)
Here, V τ
ϑ
i (G
τϑ
i , α
τϑ
i , G
τϑ
j , α
τϑ
j ) = max(Fτϑ ,Mτϑ) and (G
τϑ
i , α
τϑ
i ) is at τ
ϑ a best reply to
(Gτ
ϑ
j , α
τϑ
j ). Indeed, using the stopping time τˆ
ϑ = inf{t ≥ ϑ |Lt > Ft} ≥ τ
ϑ, this follows on
{τϑ = τˆϑ} ∈ Fτϑ from Proposition 7.1 applied at τˆ
ϑ, whereas it is easily verified on {τϑ < τˆϑ}
by Definitions 2.5, C.1 for Gτ
ϑ
i (τ
ϑ) = Gτ
ϑ
j (τ
ϑ) = 1, as then τϑ < inf{t ≥ τϑ |ατ
ϑ
i (t)+α
τϑ
j (t) >
0} and Mτϑ ≥ Fτϑ (due to right-continuity).
Suppose player i deviates to any feasible (Gϑa , α
ϑ
a). First assume α
ϑ
a(t) ≡ 0 for t < τ
ϑ.
Then the expected payoff can be written like (B.9), with (Gτ
ϑ
a , α
τϑ
a ) constructed to be time-
consistent, byGτ
ϑ
a (t) = 1{t≥τϑ}(1{Gϑa (τϑ−)<1}(G
ϑ
a(t)−G
ϑ
a(τ
ϑ−))/(1−Gϑa(τ
ϑ−))+1{Gϑa (τϑ−)=1})
and ατ
ϑ
a ≡ α
ϑ
a . As this is feasible at τ
ϑ, V τ
ϑ
i (G
τϑ
a , α
τϑ
a , G
τϑ
j , α
τϑ
j ) ≤ V
τϑ
i (G
τϑ
i , α
τϑ
i , G
τϑ
j , α
τϑ
j ), so
replacing the former by the latter in the analogue of (B.9) yields at least V ϑi (G
ϑ
a , α
ϑ
a , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j ).
Now consider the hypothesis Mτϑ = V
τϑ
i (G
τϑ
i , α
τϑ
i , G
τϑ
j , α
τϑ
j ) (= max(Fτϑ ,Mτϑ) for the
true Mτϑ as observed before). Then (B.9) becomes also player i’s expected payoff from
standard mixed strategies represented by Gϑi , G
ϑ
j , as G
ϑ
i (τ
ϑ) = Gϑj (τ
ϑ) = 1. Moreover, the
bound for V ϑi (G
ϑ
a , α
ϑ
a , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j ) constructed analogously to (B.9) becomes the expected payoff
from the standard mixed strategy given by Gϑa adjusted to G
ϑ
a(τ
ϑ) = 1 (which is still feasible)
when played against Gϑj . As the hypothesis induces Mτϑ ≥ Fτϑ , and as Fτϑ
i
≥Mτϑ
i
on {τϑi <
τϑ} by construction, Theorem 5.1 now implies V ϑi (G
ϑ
a , α
ϑ
a , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j ) ≤ V
ϑ
i (G
ϑ
i , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j ).
Furthermore, Lemma 3.1 implies that under the hypothesis on Mτϑ , the expected payoff
from any extended mixed strategy at ϑ played against the standard mixed strategy represented
by Gϑj can never exceed V
ϑ
i (G
ϑ
i , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j ). Therefore, to deal with arbitrary feasible α
ϑ
a , it
still suffices to bound the expected payoff by one from a feasible strategy played against Gϑj .
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If not necessarily τϑ ≤ τˆϑa := inf{t ≥ ϑ |α
ϑ
a(t) > 0}, then the previous argument can be
adjusted as follows. As αϑj (t) ≡ 0 for t < τ
ϑ, the analogue of (B.9) for (Gϑa , α
ϑ
a) has integrals
and sum restricted to [0, τϑ ∧ τˆϑa ), the expectation additionally includes 1{τˆϑa<τϑ}(λ
ϑ
L,iLτˆϑa +
λϑL,jFτˆϑa + λ
ϑ
MMτˆϑa ), and the continuation payoff applies on {τ
ϑ ≤ τˆϑa }. The bound on
V ϑi (G
ϑ
a , α
ϑ
a , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j ) is produced by the same estimate on the continuation value. If (G
ϑ
a , α
ϑ
a)
is again adjusted to satisfy Gϑa(τ
ϑ) = 1 and αϑa(t) ≡ 0 for t ∈ [τ
ϑ,∞) (which is feasible),
then its expected payoff when played against Gϑj under the same hypothesis on Mτϑ becomes
indeed the present bound. To see this now, the only difference is to note that nothing changes
on {τˆϑa < τ
ϑ}, because then the outcome probabilities from (αϑa , α
ϑ
j ) at τˆ
ϑ
a do not depend on
values for t ≥ τϑ, and Mτϑ has no effect.
Verifying optimality for player j is completely analogous, as the specific roles of i and j
have not been used. Similarly, if Fτ = Mτ or τ = inf{t > τ |Lt > Ft} whenever Lτ = Fτ ,
then the condition ∆Gϑi (M − F ) = 0 at τ
ϑ
i a.s. on {τ
ϑ
i < τ
ϑ} from Theorem 5.1 holds, and
the previous arguments prove that (Gϑi , α
ϑ
i ) is a best reply to itself.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 8.1
We begin with three Lemmas B.2–B.4, which establish some important necessary conditions
for strategies and payoffs in payoff-symmetric equilibria. They are crucial for the subsequent
proof of Proposition 8.1.
Lemma B.2. In any payoff-symmetric subgame-perfect equilibrium and for any ϑ ∈ T ,
∫
[0,t)
1{Ls 6=Fs}
(
1−Gϑ2 (s−)
)
dGϑ1 (s) =
∫
[0,t)
1{Ls 6=Fs}
(
1−Gϑ1 (s−)
)
dGϑ2 (s)
for all t ∈ R+ a.s. and hence
1{Lt 6=Ft}
dGϑ1 (t)(
1−Gϑ1 (t−)
) = 1{Lt 6=Ft} dGϑ2 (t)(1−Gϑ2 (t−)) , (B.10)
which is to be interpreted as “ = 0” if (1 − Gϑ1 (t−))(1 − G
ϑ
2 (t−)) = 0. Both representations
also hold with (1−Gϑ1 (·)), (1−G
ϑ
2 (·)) in place of the left-hand limits.
Proof. First consider arbitrary τ ∈ T with ϑ ≤ τ ≤ τˆϑ = inf{t ≥ ϑ |αϑ1 (t) + α
ϑ
2 (t) > 0} a.s.
Analogously to (B.9), time-consistency and iterated expectations imply for i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j,
that
V ϑi
(
Gϑi , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
)
= E
[∫
[0,τ)
(
1−Gϑj
)
LdGϑi +
∫
[0,τ)
(
1−Gϑi
)
F dGϑj +
∑
[0,τ)
M∆Gϑi∆G
ϑ
j
+
(
1−Gϑi (τ−)
)(
1−Gϑj (τ−)
)
V τi
(
Gτi , α
τ
i , G
τ
j , α
τ
j
) ∣∣∣∣Fϑ
]
(B.11)
41
= E
[∫
[0,τ)
(
1−Gϑj (s−)
)
Ls dG
ϑ
i (s) +
∫
[0,τ)
(
1−Gϑi (s−)
)
Fs dG
ϑ
j (s)
+
∑
[0,τ)
(Ms − Ls − Fs)∆G
ϑ
i (s)∆G
ϑ
j (s)
+
(
1−Gϑi (τ−)
)(
1−Gϑj (τ−)
)
V τi
(
Gτi , α
τ
i , G
τ
j , α
τ
j
) ∣∣∣∣Fϑ
]
.
In a payoff-symmetric equilibrium, V ϑ1 (·)− V
ϑ
2 (·) = V
τ
1 (·)− V
τ
2 (·) = 0. Hence,
E
[∫
[0,τ)
(
1−Gϑ2 (s−)
)
(Ls − Fs) dG
ϑ
1 −
∫
[0,τ)
(
1−Gϑ1 (s−)
)
(Ls − Fs) dG
ϑ
2
∣∣∣∣Fϑ
]
= 0
for any τ ∈ [ϑ, τˆϑ]. The integrals represent two signed optional random measures,46 which
agree on all optional sets in [0, τˆϑ) (trivially on [0, ϑ) by Gϑi (ϑ−) = 0; the optional σ-field
is generated by the stochastic intervals [0, τ), τ ∈ T ). L and F are optional processes,
so we may cancel (L − F ) 6= 0 to observe two left-continuous (thus optional) processes∫
[0,t) 1{Ls 6=Fs}(1 − G
ϑ
2 (s−)) dG
ϑ
1 (s) and
∫
[0,t) 1{Ls 6=Fs}(1 − G
ϑ
1 (s−)) dG
ϑ
2 (s) that agree in ex-
pectation at any stopping time τ ≤ τˆϑ. They are thus indistinguishable up to τˆϑ by the
uniqueness of optional projections.
As Gϑ1 (s) ∨G
ϑ
2 (s) = 1 for all s ≥ τˆ
ϑ, the measures
∫
[0,t) 1{Ls 6=Fs}(1 −G
ϑ
j (s−)) dG
ϑ
i (s) can
only depend on i, j on [τˆϑ], specifically when Lτˆϑ 6= Fτˆϑ and G
ϑ
i (τˆ
ϑ) < Gϑj (τˆ
ϑ) = 1 and
hence τˆϑ = inf{t ≥ ϑ |αϑj (t) > 0} < inf{t ≥ ϑ |α
ϑ
i (t) > 0}. By time-consistency, the same
properties hold for the strategies in the subgame starting at τˆϑ, and it is then easy to check
from Definition C.1 that
V τˆ
ϑ
i (·) = G
τˆϑ
i (τˆ
ϑ)
(
1− ατˆ
ϑ
j (τˆ
ϑ)
)
Lτˆϑ +
(
1−Gτˆ
ϑ
i (τˆ
ϑ)
)
Fτˆϑ +G
τˆϑ
i (τˆ
ϑ)ατˆ
ϑ
j (τˆ
ϑ)Mτˆϑ
= Gτˆ
ϑ
i (τˆ
ϑ)
((
1− ατˆ
ϑ
j (τˆ
ϑ)
)
Lτˆϑ − Fτˆϑ + α
τˆϑ
j (τˆ
ϑ)Mτˆϑ
)
+ Fτˆϑ , (B.12)
V τˆ
ϑ
j (·) = G
τˆϑ
i (τˆ
ϑ)
(
1− ατˆ
ϑ
j (τˆ
ϑ)
)
Fτˆϑ +
(
1−Gτˆ
ϑ
i (τˆ
ϑ)
)
Lτˆϑ +G
τˆϑ
i (τˆ
ϑ)ατˆ
ϑ
j (τˆ
ϑ)Mτˆϑ
= ατˆ
ϑ
j (τˆ
ϑ)Gτˆ
ϑ
i (τˆ
ϑ)
(
Mτˆϑ − Fτˆϑ
)
+Gτˆ
ϑ
i (τˆ
ϑ)Fτˆϑ +
(
1−Gτˆ
ϑ
i (τˆ
ϑ)
)
Lτˆϑ . (B.13)
Given Lτˆϑ 6= Fτˆϑ , payoffs are symmetric if and only if G
τˆϑ
i (τˆ
ϑ)(1 − ατˆ
ϑ
j (τˆ
ϑ)) = 1 −Gτˆ
ϑ
i (τˆ
ϑ).
Then Gτˆ
ϑ
i (τˆ
ϑ) > 0, and given also Gτˆ
ϑ
i (τˆ
ϑ) < 1, by linearity in (B.12) thus (1−ατˆ
ϑ
j (τˆ
ϑ))Lτˆϑ−
Fτˆϑ + α
τˆϑ
j (τˆ
ϑ)Mτˆϑ = 0. With Lτˆϑ 6= Fτˆϑ , this implies α
τˆϑ
j (τˆ
ϑ) > 0, and that Mτˆϑ = Fτˆϑ
only if ατˆ
ϑ
j (τˆ
ϑ) = 1, but this is excluded by payoff symmetry and Gτˆ
ϑ
i (τˆ
ϑ) < 1. However,
ατˆ
ϑ
j (τˆ
ϑ) ∈ (0, 1) and Gτˆ
ϑ
i (τˆ
ϑ) > 0 requires Mτˆϑ = Fτˆϑ by linearity in (B.13), which shows
that we cannot have Lτˆϑ 6= Fτˆϑ and G
τˆϑ
i (τˆ
ϑ) < 1 with positive probability. This implies that
our previous measures agree on all of [0,∞) a.s.
46
∫
[0,t]
(1−Gϑ2 (s−))(Ls − Fs) dG
ϑ
1 (s) and
∫
[0,t]
(1−Gϑ1 (s−))(Ls − Fs) dG
ϑ
2 (s) are adapted, right-continuous,
and of finite variation. Their minimal decomposition is using (L− F )+ and (L− F )−, respectively.
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The representation (B.10) is obtained by integrating [(1 − Gϑ1 (s−))(1 − G
ϑ
2 (s−))]
−1 on
{Gϑ1 (s−) ∨ G
ϑ
2 (s−) < 1} w.r.t. each measure. Finally, 1{L6=F}(1 − G
ϑ
2 ) dG
ϑ
1 = 1{L6=F}(1 −
Gϑ1 ) dG
ϑ
2 is obtained analogously, without even rewriting (B.11).
Lemma B.3. In any payoff-symmetric subgame-perfect equilibrium and for any ϑ ∈ T , it
holds that Gϑ1 (t) = G
ϑ
2 (t) for all t ∈ [ϑ, inf{t ≥ ϑ |
∫
[0,t] 1{L=F} (dG
ϑ
1 + dG
ϑ
2 ) > 0}) a.s.
Proof. By Lemma B.2, 1{L6=F}(1 − G
ϑ
j ) dG
ϑ
i = 1{L6=F}(1 − G
ϑ
i ) dG
ϑ
j , i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j. On
the interval [ϑ, inf{t ≥ ϑ |
∫
[0,t] 1{L=F}(dG
ϑ
1 + dG
ϑ
2 ) > 0}), we can ignore 1{L6=F}, so if it is
nonempty, then Gϑi (ϑ) = G
ϑ
j (ϑ) and – as long as G
ϑ
j (t) < 1 – dG
ϑ
i (t) = φt dG
ϑ
j (t) for
φt =
1−Gϑi (t)
1−Gϑj (t)
, φ0 = 1. (B.14)
By rearranging (B.14), for all t ∈ [ϑ, inf{t ≥ ϑ |
∫
[0,t] 1{L=F}(dG
ϑ
1 + dG
ϑ
2 ) > 0 or G
ϑ
j (t) = 1}),
Gϑi (t) = 1−
(
1−Gϑj (t)
)
φt = G
ϑ
i (0) +
∫
(0,t]
φs dG
ϑ
j (s)
⇔ φt − 1 = G
ϑ
j (t)φt −G
ϑ
j (0)−
∫
(0,t]
φs dG
ϑ
j (s)
⇔ φt − φ0 =
∫
(0,t]
Gϑj (s−) dφs.
The last line is obtained by integration by parts, as (φt) is of finite variation and right-
continuous for t < inf{t ≥ ϑ |Gϑj (t) = 1}. It implies that φt must indeed be constant before
Gϑj attains one. If G
ϑ
j jumps to one on the given interval when L 6= F , then (1−G
ϑ
i )∆G
ϑ
j =
(1−Gϑj )∆G
ϑ
i = 0, i.e., G
ϑ
i must attain one, too, which completes the proof.
Lemma B.4. In any payoff-symmetric subgame-perfect equilibrium and for any ϑ ∈ T , it
holds that, on {∆Gϑ1 (ϑ) ∨∆G
ϑ
2 (ϑ) > 0},
Fϑ ≤ max(Lϑ,Mϑ) and V
ϑ
1 (·) = V
ϑ
2 (·) ≤ ∆G
ϑ
j (ϑ)max(Fϑ,Mϑ) +
(
1−∆Gϑj (ϑ)
)
Lϑ
for j = 1, 2, a.s.
Proof. Let i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j. Note that ∆Gϑi (ϑ) = G
ϑ
i (ϑ) and recall G
ϑ
i (τˆ
ϑ) = 1 for
τˆϑ = inf{t ≥ ϑ |αϑi (t) + α
ϑ
j (t) > 0}. The equilibrium payoff must be at least that from
the feasible strategy (Gϑa , α
ϑ
i ) satisfying G
ϑ
a(t) ≡ 1 for t ≥ ϑ, which is V
ϑ
i (G
ϑ
a , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j ) =
Gϑj (ϑ)Mϑ + (1 − G
ϑ
j (ϑ))Lϑ on {ϑ < τˆ
ϑ}. Another feasible strategy is (Gϑb , α
ϑ
i ) given by
Gϑb (t) = 1{Gϑ
i
(ϑ)<1}(G
ϑ
i (t)−G
ϑ
i (ϑ))(1 −G
ϑ
i (ϑ))
−1 + 1{Gϑ
i
(ϑ)=1} for t ≥ ϑ, which still satisfies
time-consistency with (Gτˆ
ϑ
i , α
τˆϑ
i ). By (B.11) then
V ϑi
(
Gϑi , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
)
= Gϑi (ϑ)V
ϑ
i
(
Gϑa , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
)
+
(
1−Gϑi (ϑ)
)
V ϑi
(
Gϑb , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
)
, (B.15)
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so Gϑi (ϑ) > 0 implies V
ϑ
i (G
ϑ
i , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j ) = V
ϑ
i (G
ϑ
a , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j ) ≥ V
ϑ
i (G
ϑ
b , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j ), i.e., in
particular equilibrium payoffs equal to Gϑj (ϑ)Mϑ+(1−G
ϑ
j (ϑ))Lϑ on {ϑ < τˆ
ϑ}. Consider fur-
thermore the feasible strategies (Gϑn, α
ϑ
i ) for n ∈ N\{1, 2} satisfying G
ϑ
n(t) = 1{t≥(ϑ+n−1)∧τˆϑ}.
Then limn→∞E[1AV
ϑ
i (G
ϑ
n, α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j )] = E[1A(G
ϑ
j (ϑ)Fϑ + (1 −G
ϑ
j (ϑ))Lϑ)] for any A ∈ Fϑ
with A ⊆ {ϑ < τˆϑ}. Indeed, we have pointwise convergence inside the expectation from
Definition 2.5 by right-continuity of L and Gϑj , and we may pass to the limit in expectation
as L and
∫
F dGϑj are of class (D) (the latter by Lemma A.2). As the limit cannot exceed
E[1AV
ϑ
i (G
ϑ
i , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j )], choosing A = {ϑ < τˆ
ϑ} ∩ {Gϑi (ϑ)G
ϑ
j (ϑ)(Fϑ −Mϑ) > 0} shows that
this must have probability zero. Therefore, Mϑ ≥ Fϑ on {ϑ < τˆ
ϑ} ∩ {Gϑ1 (ϑ) ∧ G
ϑ
2 (ϑ) > 0},
so that both claims hold. On {ϑ < τˆϑ} ∩ {Gϑ1 (ϑ) ∨ G
ϑ
2 (ϑ) > G
ϑ
1 (ϑ) ∧ G
ϑ
2 (ϑ) = 0}, Lϑ = Fϑ
due to Lemma B.2, which implies the first claimed inequality, and also the second as now
V ϑi (·) = Lϑ when G
ϑ
i (ϑ) > 0 and otherwise V
ϑ
j (·) = Lϑ.
It remains to consider {ϑ = τˆϑ}. Suppose specifically ϑ = inf{t ≥ ϑ |αϑj (t) > 0}, so
Gϑj (ϑ) = 1. Then it is easy to check from Definition C.1 that the value of V
ϑ
i (G
ϑ
i , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j ) =
λϑL,iLϑ+λ
ϑ
L,jFϑ+λ
ϑ
MMϑ is a convex combination of (1−α
ϑ
j (ϑ))Lϑ+α
ϑ
j (ϑ)Mϑ and Fϑ, and that
these are resp. player i’s payoffs from the feasible strategies (Gϑ, α∞) and (G∞, α∞), where
Gϑ(t) = 1{t≥ϑ} and α
∞(t) = G∞(t) = 1{t≥∞}, when played against the given (G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j ).
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Hence, on {Fϑ > max(Mϑ, Lϑ)}, we would need to have V
ϑ
i (·) = Fϑ and thus λ
ϑ
L,j = 1,
implying V ϑj (·) = Lϑ, contradicting payoff symmetry. Therefore, the first claim must hold.
As to the second, given Gϑj (ϑ) = 1, suppose V
ϑ
i (·) > max(Fϑ,Mϑ), so necessarily λ
ϑ
L,i > 0 and
Lϑ > Fϑ. Specifically, we would now have V
ϑ
i (·) = (1 − α
ϑ
j (ϑ))Lϑ + α
ϑ
j (ϑ)Mϑ > Fϑ, which is
in fact only possible if λϑL,j = 0. This, however, would again contradict payoff symmetry.
Still supposing ϑ = inf{t ≥ ϑ |αϑj (t) > 0}, it remains to verify the second claim for i in
place of j and Gϑi (ϑ) < 1, whence ϑ < inf{t ≥ ϑ |α
ϑ
i (t) > 0}. Then Lϑ = Fϑ by Lemma B.2
and the claim holds if V ϑi (·) = Fϑ. Otherwise, again V
ϑ
i (·) = (1− α
ϑ
j (ϑ))Lϑ + α
ϑ
j (ϑ)Mϑ > Fϑ
and thus λϑL,j = 0, which would by Definition C.1 clearly contradict G
ϑ
i (ϑ) < 1.
Proof of Proposition 8.1. Suppose ((Gϑ1 , α
ϑ
1 );ϑ ∈ T ), ((G
ϑ
2 , α
ϑ
2 );ϑ ∈ T ) are a payoff-
symmetric subgame-perfect equilibrium, and fix any ϑ ∈ T and i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j. The proof
is build on two observations. First, for any stopping time τ ≥ ϑ, the strategy (Gτi , α
τ
i ) is also
feasible in the subgame starting at ϑ, so
V ϑi
(
Gϑi , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
)
≥ V ϑi
(
Gτi , α
τ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
)
. (B.16)
47In particular in the last case in Definition C.1, when ϑ = inf{t ≥ ϑ |αϑi (t) > 0} = inf{t ≥ ϑ |α
ϑ
j (t) > 0},
but αϑi (ϑ) = α
ϑ
j (ϑ) = 0, then simply V
ϑ
i (·) = λL,iLϑ + (1− λL,i)Fϑ.
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Second, if τ ≤ τˆϑ, then
V ϑi
(
Gτi , α
τ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
)
= E
[∫
[0,τ)
F dGϑj +
(
1−Gϑj (τ−)
)
V τi
(
Gτi , α
τ
i , G
τ
j , α
τ
j
) ∣∣∣∣Fϑ
]
(B.17)
by time-consistency; cf. (B.11). The proof strategy is to identify stopping times τ ≤ inf{t ≥
ϑ |Gϑi (t)∨G
ϑ
j (t) ≥ 1} such that (B.16) is binding, (B.17) also holds with L∧F in place of F ,
and, when passing to a limit, also Lτ ∧Fτ in place of V
τ
i (·). Then both claims of Proposition
8.1 follow from Lemma 3.1. Indeed, then the right-hand side of (B.17) equals player j’s (!)
payoff from the standard mixed strategy represented by Gϑj when played against G
ϑ
a given by
Gϑa(t) = 1{t≥τ}, and when L, F and M are replaced by L ∧ F , because then S
ϑ
j (t) becomes
Lt∧τ ∧ Ft∧τ for all t ≥ ϑ.
To establish the desired representation of V ϑi (·), we begin by showing that (B.16) binds if
Gϑi (τ−) ≤ 1−ε a.s. for some ε ∈ (0, 1). Suppose the latter holds and set λ = (1−ε)
−1 ∈ (1,∞).
Then defineGϑa byG
ϑ
a(t) = λG
ϑ
i (t) for t ∈ [0, τ) andG
ϑ
a(t) = λG
ϑ
i (τ−)+(1−λG
ϑ
i (τ−))(G
ϑ
i (t)−
Gϑi (τ−)). This implies G
ϑ
i (t) = 1 ⇒ G
ϑ
a(t) = 1 for all t ∈ [0,∞], so (G
ϑ
a , α
ϑ
i ) is feasible at
ϑ, and it satisfies time-consistency with (Gτi , α
τ
i ) by construction. Therefore, we can apply
(B.11) also for Gϑa in place of G
ϑ
i , to see that V
ϑ
i (G
ϑ
a , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j ) = λV
ϑ
i (G
ϑ
i , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j ) −
(λ−1)V ϑi (G
τ
i , α
τ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j ), and thus, if (B.16) were strict with positive probability, this would
contradict optimality of (Gϑi , α
ϑ
i ).
Hence, with τG,ϑi (x) = inf{t ≥ ϑ |G
ϑ
i (t) > x} for any x ∈ [0, 1) and analogously for j,
(B.16) binds for each of the stopping times
τ¯n := τ
G,ϑ
i
(
1− n−1
)
∧ τG,ϑj
(
1− n−1
)
∧ τ¯ , n ∈ N,
where τ¯ := inf{t ≥ ϑ |
∫
[0,t] 1{F≥L} (dG
ϑ
i + dG
ϑ
j ) > 0}. Moreover, τ¯n ≤ inf{t ≥ ϑ |G
ϑ
i (t) ∨
Gϑj (t) ≥ 1} ≤ τˆ
ϑ, such that (B.17) applies, and also with L ∧ F in place of F by definition
of τ¯ . The latter still hold for the monotone limit τ¯∞ := limn→∞ τ¯n ≤ τ¯ , but then (B.16) is
not necessarily binding anymore. Therefore, we need to show that E[V ϑi (G
ϑ
i , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j )] =
E[V ϑi (G
τ¯∞
i , α
τ¯∞
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j )], resp., as (B.16) binds for each τ¯n, that we can pass to the limit in
expectation in (B.17), with a suitable continuation payoff.
The integral converges as n→∞, also in expectation because it is of class (D) by Lemma
A.2. As to the continuation payoffs, we first argue that {V τ¯ni (·);n ∈ N} is uniformly integrable.
By Definition 2.5, and as λϑL,i, λ
ϑ
L,j, λ
ϑ
M ∈ [0, (1 −G
ϑ
i (τˆ
ϑ−))(1 −Gϑj (τˆ
ϑ−)] ⊆ [0, 1],
∣∣∣V ϑi (Gϑi , αϑi , Gϑj , αϑj )∣∣∣ ≤ E
[ ∫
[0,∞)
|L| dGϑi +
∫
[0,∞)
|F | dGϑj +
∫
[0,∞)
|M | dGϑi
+ |Lτˆϑ |+ |Fτˆϑ |+ |Mτˆϑ |
∣∣∣∣Fϑ
]
.
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Applying Lemma 3.1 with G∞ given by G∞(t) = 1{t≥∞} in place of G
ϑ
j (whence S
ϑ
i (t) = L(t)
for all t ∈ R+) and |L| in place of L shows that E[
∫
[0,∞) |L| dG
ϑ
i |Fϑ] ≤ ess supτ≥ϑE[|Lτ | |Fϑ].
The latter is the value of the Snell envelope of |L|, denoted U|L|, which is itself bounded by
the uniformly integrable martingale M|L| from its Doob-Meyer decomposition; cf. Section 3.1.
Treating the other integrals and remaining terms analogously, hence
∣∣∣V ϑi (Gϑi , αϑi , Gϑj , αϑj )∣∣∣ ≤ 2(M|L|(ϑ) +M|F |(ϑ) +M|M |(ϑ)).
As this holds for any ϑ ∈ T and feasible strategies for the respective subgame, the family
{2(M|L|(τ¯n)+M|F |(τ¯n)+M|M |(τ¯n));n ∈ N} is a uniformly integrable bound for {|V
τ¯n
i (·)|;n ∈
N}.
Now, concerning convergence, first note that when Gϑj (τ¯∞−) = 1, then dG
ϑ
j only charges
{F < L}, so also Gϑi (τ¯∞−) = 1 by Lemma B.3 and vice-versa. Therefore, on {G
ϑ
i (τ¯∞−) =
1} = {Gϑj (τ¯∞−) = 1}, (1−G
ϑ
j (τ¯n−))V
τ¯n
i (·)→ 0 in expectation by Lemma A.6. The remaining
set is {Gϑi (τ¯∞−) ∨G
ϑ
j (τ¯∞−) < 1} = {∃n ∈ N : τ¯n = τ¯}, so that V
τ¯n
i (·)→ V
τ¯
i (·) = V
τ¯∞
i (·) a.s.
on this set when n→∞, and we may pass to the limit in expectation by uniform integrability.
It remains to show that on {Gϑi (τ¯∞−) ∨ G
ϑ
j (τ¯∞−) < 1}, the limit continuation payoff
V τ¯∞i (·) = V
τ¯
i (·) equals Lτ¯ ∧ Fτ¯ . We are going to apply the optimality condition from Lemma
3.1 at τ¯ , but in a variant such that equality holds for every x ∈ [0, 1) (in fact independently
of payoff symmetry, F ∧ L ≥M , and the starting date). Therefore, consider any τ ∈ T , the
standard mixed strategies represented by Gτi , G
τ
j , and define S¯
τ
i (t) := max(S
τ
i (t), S
τ
i (t+)) for
all t ∈ R+, implying S¯
τ
i (t) ≥ S¯
τ
i (t+) = S
τ
i (t+); set furthermore S¯
τ
i (∞) := S
τ
i (∞). Denoting
the right-hand side of (3.3) for τ in place of ϑ by Zτi , it holds that E[S
τ
i (τ
′) |Fτ ] ≤ Z
τ
i for
every stopping time τ ′ ≥ τ , with equality for a.e. x ∈ [0, 1) if τ ′ = τG,τi (x), as V
τ
i (·) = Z
τ
i
in equilibrium. Keeping Zτi fixed, we now show that the same conditions hold for S¯
τ
i , even
with equality for every x ∈ [0, 1). Hence, consider an arbitrary stopping time τ ′ ≥ τ and let
A ∈ Fτ ′ be the event {S
τ
i (τ
′+) > Sτi (τ
′)} = {∆Gτj (τ
′)(Fτ ′ −Mτ ′) > 0} by right-continuity
of L and Gτj . With the stopping times τ
′ + 1An
−1 for any n ∈ N (cf. Lemma A.3) then
Sτi (τ
′+ 1An
−1)→ S¯τi (τ
′) a.s. as n→∞. Moreover, for any B ∈ Fτ , E[1BS
τ
i (τ
′+ 1An
−1)] ≤
E[1BZ
τ
i ] by iterated expectations, where we may pass to the limit as S
τ
i is of class (D).
Choosing B = {E[S¯τi (τ
′) |Fτ ] > Z
τ
i } shows that this event must have probability zero. In
particular, for every x ∈ [0, 1) now E[Sτi (τ
G,τ
i (x)) |Fτ ] ≤ E[S¯
τ
i (τ
G,τ
i (x)) |Fτ ] ≤ Z
τ
i , with
equality throughout for a.e. x.48 Now fix any x ∈ [0, 1), and let for every n ∈ N then xn ∈
(x+(1−x)(n+1)−1, x+(1−x)n−1] be such that E[S¯τi (τ
G,τ
i (xn)) |Fτ ] = Z
τ
i . By monotonicity
and right-continuity of τG,τi (·), τ
G,τ
i (xn)ց τ
G,τ
i (x) a.s., and as S¯
τ
i (·) is upper-semi-continuous
from the right and of class (D), thus E[S¯τi (τ
G,τ
i (x))] ≥ limn→∞E[S¯
τ
i (τ
G,τ
i (xn))] = E[Z
τ
i ].
48This implies that Sτi (τ
G,τ
i (x)) = S¯
τ
i (τ
G,τ
i (x)) a.s. for a.e. x ∈ [0, 1), so that the proof of Lemma 3.1 shows
that also E[
∫
Sτi dG
τ
i |Fτ ] = E[
∫
S¯τi dG
τ
i |Fτ ].
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This shows that E[S¯τi (τ
G,τ
i (x)) |Fτ ] ≤ Z
τ
i must be a.s. binding, too. Note that, as S
τ
i (t+) =
Sτi (t) + ∆G
τ
j (t)(Ft −Mt), the assumption F ≥ M induces that simply S¯
τ
i (t) = S
τ
i (t+) =∫
[0,t] F dG
τ
j + (1−G
τ
j (t))Lt for all t ∈ R+.
Now, to characterize V τ¯i (·), note that in the subgame starting at τ¯ , time-consistency
implies τ¯ = τG,τ¯i (0) ∧ τ
G,τ¯
j (0), so a.s. S¯
τ¯
i (τ¯ ) = Z
τ¯
i or S¯
τ¯
j (τ¯) = Z
τ¯
i as argued before, and thus
V τ¯i (·) = G
τ¯
j (τ¯ )Fτ¯ + (1−G
τ¯
j (τ¯ ))Lτ¯ or V
τ¯
j (·) = G
τ¯
i (τ¯)Fτ¯ + (1−G
τ¯
i (τ¯))Lτ¯ . By right-continuity,
Fτ¯ ≥ Lτ¯ , and this must be binding by Lemma B.4 and the assumption L ≥ M whenever
Gτ¯i (τ¯) > 0 or G
τ¯
j (τ¯ ) > 0, so we must a.s. have V
τ¯
i (·) = V
τ¯
j (·) = Lτ¯ ≤ Fτ¯ .
This completes the proof. Note that by Lemma B.4 and the assumption L ≥ M , we can
also state the result in the form
V ϑi
(
Gϑi , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
)
≤ ∆Gϑj (ϑ)Fϑ +
(
1−∆Gϑj (ϑ)
)
UL∧F (ϑ) ≤ UL∧F (ϑ).
B.3 Proof of Theorem 8.2
Proposition 8.1 and proof show that in any payoff-symmetric subgame-perfect equilibrium,
the continuation values at any ϑ ∈ T are at most
∆Gϑj (ϑ)Fϑ +
(
1−∆Gϑj (ϑ)
)
ess sup
τ∈T : τ≥ϑ
E
[
Lτ ∧ Fτ
∣∣Fϑ] ≤ UL∧F (ϑ),
in fact considering only stopping times τ ≤ inf{t ≥ ϑ |Gϑi (t) ∨ G
ϑ
j (t) = 1}. However, when
Lϑ > UL∧F (ϑ) and G
ϑ
j (ϑ) < 1, then ϑ < inf{t ≥ ϑ |α
ϑ
j (t) > 0} and player i’s value V
ϑ
i (·)
would be at least ∆Gϑj (ϑ)Fϑ + (1 −∆G
ϑ
j (ϑ))Lϑ by considering stopping times ϑ + n
−1 and
n → ∞ analogously to the proof of Lemma B.4; a contradiction. Therefore, fixing ϑ and
letting τn = inf{t ≥ ϑ |Lt − UL∧F (t) ≥ n
−1} for each n ∈ N, necessarily Gτnj (τn) = 1 as
Lτn > UL∧F (τn) on {τn <∞} by right-continuity under Assumption 2.1 (iii) (cf. Section 3.1).
Time-consistency implies also Gϑj (τn) = 1, and hence, as τn ց τ0(ϑ), G
ϑ
j (τ0(ϑ)) = 1 for some
j ∈ {1, 2}. The continuation values are then actually bounded by U(L∧F )τ0(ϑ) ≤ UL∧F . This
argument of course iterates, inducing decreasing sequences of stopping times (τn(ϑ))n and Snell
envelopes (U(L∧F )τn(ϑ))n, as increasingly strict constraints are introduced. The decreasing
sequence of stopping times is bounded below by ϑ, so the limit τ˜(ϑ) = limn→∞ τn(ϑ) exists
and is a stopping time as well.
It is convenient to have optimal stopping times that resp. attain U(L∧F )τn(ϑ) . They exist
because each process (L∧F )τn(ϑ) is clearly right-continuous and of class (D), but also upper-
semi-continuous in expectation under Assumption 2.1 (iii). These optimal stopping times
simplify the argument to prove that τ˜(ϑ) ≤ inf{t ≥ ϑ |Lt > U(L∧F )τ˜(ϑ)(t)}. Consider an
arbitrary stopping time σ ∈ [ϑ, τ˜ (ϑ)], and for each n ∈ N, let σn ≤ τn(ϑ) be a stopping
time attaining U(L∧F )τn(ϑ)(σ) = E[(L ∧ F )σn |Fσ], where we may assume σn ≥ σn+1 because
E[(L∧F )σn+1 |Fσn∧σn+1 ] ≤ (L∧F )σn∧σn+1 by optimality of σn and σn+1 ≤ τn+1(ϑ) ≤ τn(ϑ).
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Therefore, the monotone sequence (σn)n a.s. converges to a limit stopping time σ∞ ≤ τ˜(ϑ).
Hence, as Lσ ≤ E[(L ∧ F )σn |σ] a.s. on {σ < τ˜(ϑ)} for every n ∈ N, and as (L ∧ F ) is of
class (D), E[1ALσ] ≤ E[1A(L ∧ F )σ∞ ] for every A ∈ Fσ that is a subset of {σ < τ˜(ϑ)}.
Choosing A = {Lσ > E[(L ∧ F )σ∞ |Fσ ]} ∩ {σ < τ˜(ϑ)} then shows that this has probability
zero. In particular, thus Lσ ≤ E[(L ∧ F )σ∞ |Fσ] ≤ U(L∧F )τ˜(ϑ)(σ) on {σ < τ˜(ϑ)}. Let now
τn = inf{t ≥ ϑ |L(t) − U(L∧F )τ˜(ϑ)(t) ≥ n
−1} ∧ τ˜(ϑ) for each n ∈ N. By right-continuity then
Lτn > U(L∧F )τ˜(ϑ)(τn) on {τn < τ˜(ϑ)}, so by the previous argument we must have τn = τ˜(ϑ)
a.s. for every n ∈ N. This shows that also inf{t ≥ ϑ |L(t) > U(L∧F )τ˜(ϑ)(t)} ∧ τ˜(ϑ) = τ˜(ϑ) a.s.
as desired, resp. Lt ≤ U(L∧F )τ˜(ϑ)(t) for all t ∈ [ϑ, τ˜ (ϑ)) a.s.
τ˜(ϑ) is maximal in this respect by construction: Whenever we have another τˆ ≥ ϑ such that
L ≤ U(L∧F )τˆ on [ϑ, τˆ ), then τˆ ≤ τ0(ϑ) a.s., because U(L∧F )τˆ ≤ UL∧F . So U(L∧F )τˆ ≤ U(L∧F )τ0(ϑ) ,
and by iteration τˆ ≤ τn(ϑ) for all n ∈ N.
Let us remark some further regularity properties. First,
τ˜(ϑ) = inf{t ≥ τ˜(ϑ) |Lt > Ft} a.s. (B.18)
and thus Lτ˜(ϑ) ≥ Fτ˜(ϑ) by right-continuity, because we would otherwise have L = L ∧ F ≤
U(L∧F )τn(ϑ) for all n ∈ N0 between τ˜(ϑ) and the stopping time on the right-hand side. Second,
for any ϑ′ ∈ T ,
τ˜(ϑ′) = τ˜(ϑ) on {ϑ′ ∈ [ϑ, τ˜ (ϑ)]} a.s. (B.19)
by construction. Therefore, τ˜(ϑ) is monotone in ϑ and
τ˜(ϑ) = lim
n→∞
τ˜(ϑn) a.s. (B.20)
for any sequence of stopping times ϑn ց ϑ. Indeed, denoting the monotone limit on the
right-hand side by τ∞ ≥ τ˜(ϑ), then ϑn ∨ τ∞ ∈ [ϑn, τ˜(ϑn)] ⇒ τ˜(τ∞) ≤ τ˜(ϑn ∨ τ∞) = τ˜(ϑn)
for all n ∈ N, so τ∞ = τ˜(τ∞) a.s. Then also τ∞ ≤ τ˜(ϑn) must bind on {ϑn ≤ τ∞} for every
n ∈ N, implying τ˜(ϑn ∧ τ∞) = τ∞ and hence Lt ≤ U(L∧F )τ∞ (t) for all t ∈ [ϑn ∧ τ∞, τ∞)
a.s. The latter holds then a.s. for all n ∈ N, i.e., the inequality holds a.s. on (ϑ, τ∞) and by
right-continuity also at ϑ on {ϑ < τ∞}. The maximality of τ˜(ϑ) regarding this property now
implies that τ∞ ≥ τ˜(ϑ) cannot be strict with positive probability.
Next, define the process L˜ by
L˜t :=

Lt t < τ˜(ϑ)Fτ˜ (ϑ) t ≥ τ˜(ϑ) (B.21)
with Snell envelope UL˜ and its compensator DL˜. From Lτ˜(ϑ) ≥ Fτ˜(ϑ) and L ≤ U(L∧F )τ˜(ϑ) on
[ϑ, τ˜ (ϑ)), we see that (L ∧ F )τ˜(ϑ) ≤ L˜ ≤ U(L∧F )τ˜(ϑ) ≤ UL˜ on [ϑ,∞]. As the Snell envelope is
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the smallest supermartingale dominating the payoff process, the last inequality must actually
bind and thus also DL˜ = D(L∧F )τ˜(ϑ) on [ϑ,∞]. By this observation we obtain
∫
[ϑ,∞]
1{L>F} dDL˜ =
∑
[ϑ,∞]
∆DL˜ = 0 a.s. (B.22)
Indeed, the path regularity of (L∧F )τ˜(ϑ) verified before implies continuity of D(L∧F )τ˜(ϑ) , and
(3.6) applied to (L∧F )τ˜(ϑ) in place of L with U(L∧F )τ˜(ϑ) ≥ L on [ϑ, τ˜ (ϑ)) and D(L∧F )τ˜(ϑ) = DL˜
yields
0 =
∫
[0,∞]
(
U(L∧F )τ˜(ϑ) − (L ∧ F )
τ˜(ϑ)
)
dDL˜
≥
∫
[ϑ,τ˜(ϑ))
(
L− (L ∧ F )
)
dDL˜ =
∫
[ϑ,τ˜(ϑ))
1{L>F}
(
L− F
)
dDL˜ ≥ 0,
which must hold with equality throughout. Furthermore, DL˜ = D(L∧F )τ˜(ϑ) is right-continuous
and flat from τ˜(ϑ) on, so it does not charge [τ˜ (ϑ),∞].
Now we can define equilibrium strategies ((Gϑ1 , α˜
ϑ
1 );ϑ ∈ T ) and ((G
ϑ
2 , α˜
ϑ
2 );ϑ ∈ T ) as
follows. Pick i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j, and then define Gϑi , G
ϑ
j for every ϑ ∈ T as in Theorem
5.1 with τϑ = τ˜(ϑ). α˜ϑi , α˜
ϑ
j will be defined later, as we need a careful construction. The
family (Gϑi ;ϑ ∈ T ) satisfies the time-consistency condition from Theorem 5.3 by (B.19); the
same holds for j. Moreover, given τϑ = τ˜(ϑ) and the assumption F ≥M , L˜τ
ϑ
from Theorem
5.1 is the same as L˜ from (B.21) for any fixed ϑ. Therefore, the regularity conditions for
Dτ
ϑ
L˜
= DL˜ ensured by the hypothesis τ
ϑ ≤ inf{t ≥ |Lt > Ft} in Theorem 5.1 (which had
no other role) are now implied by (B.22): continuity and that Lτϑ
i
= Fτϑ
i
on {τϑi < τ
ϑ};
the latter now follows from
∫
1{F≤L} dDL˜ =
∫
1{F=L} dDL˜ (and right-continuity of L − F ).
Given that now furthermore Fτϑ
i
≥ Mτϑ
i
on {τϑi < τ
ϑ} holds by assumption, this means
that the proof of Theorem 7.3 can be applied if we achieve continuation equilibrium payoffs
V
τ˜(ϑ)
i (·) = V
τ˜(ϑ)
j (·) = Fτ˜(ϑ) (≥ Mτ˜ (ϑ) by assumption) for any ϑ ∈ T from time-consistent,
feasible families (α˜ϑi ;ϑ ∈ T ), (α˜
ϑ
j ;ϑ ∈ T ). This will then induce equilibrium payoffs UL˜(ϑ) =
U(L∧F )τ˜(ϑ)(ϑ) at any ϑ ∈ T .
We need to suppress αϑi , α
ϑ
j as given by Proposition 7.1 on the random intervals [ϑ, τ˜ (ϑ))
in a measurable way across all ϑ ∈ T , while ensuring that they still generate suitable equi-
librium payoffs at each τ˜(ϑ). Therefore, begin with the (optional) set A =
⋃
q∈Q+ [q, τ˜ (q)).
Then approximate any given ϑ ∈ T from above by the decreasing sequence (ϑn)n∈N, where
ϑn = 2
−n ⌈2nϑ+ 1⌉ ∈ T . Any ϑn takes values only in {k2
−n; k ∈ N¯} and thus [ϑn, τ˜(ϑn)) =∑
k∈N[k2
−n, τ˜(k2−n))1{ϑn=k2−n} a.s., which means that [ϑn, τ˜ (ϑn)) belongs to A up to a
P -nullset. Furthermore, ϑn ≤ ϑ + 2
1−n implies τ˜(ϑ) = τ˜(ϑk) for all k ≥ n on {τ˜ (ϑ) ≥
ϑ + 21−n} a.s., and therefore on this set (ϑ, τ˜(ϑ)) =
⋃
k≥n[ϑk, τ˜(ϑk)) a.s., which means that
(ϑ, τ˜ (ϑ)) belongs to A on {τ˜ (ϑ) ≥ ϑ + 21−n} up to a P -nullset. Aggregating, (ϑ, τ˜ (ϑ)) =
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(ϑ, τ˜ (ϑ))(1{τ˜ (ϑ)≥ϑ+20} +
∑
n 1{τ˜(ϑ)∈[ϑ+2−n,ϑ+21−n)}) a.s. and hence belongs to A up to a P -
nullset.
Now define α˜ϑi = α˜
ϑ
j by
α˜ϑi (t) :=
(
lim sup
uցt
1{u∈Ac}
)
αϑi (t)
for any t ∈ R+ and ϑ ∈ T , with α
ϑ
i as in Proposition 7.1. α˜
ϑ
i inherits progressive mea-
surability from its two factors, where that of the lim sup(·) holds by Theorem IV.33 (c) in
Dellacherie and Meyer (1978). Like αϑi , α˜
ϑ
i satisfies α˜
ϑ
i (t) = 1{t≥ϑ}α˜
ϑ0
i (t) for all t ∈ R+,
where ϑ0 ≡ 0, which also ensures time-consistency across ϑ. Additionally, now α˜
ϑ
i (t) = 0 for
all t ∈ [ϑ, τ˜ (ϑ)) a.s., so α˜ϑi (t) > 0⇒ G
ϑ
i (t) = G
ϑ
j (t) = 1. For feasibility, it thus only remains to
verify right-continuity when α˜ϑi (t) < 1. First note that when lim supuցt 1{u∈Ac} = 0, then also
its right-hand limit vanishes by upper-semi-continuity, such that also α˜ϑi (t) = α˜
ϑ
i (t+). When
lim supuցt 1{u∈Ac} = 1 and α˜
ϑ
i (t) < 1, then also α
ϑ
i (t) < 1, so that α
ϑ
i (·) is right-continuous in
t, and it thus remains to ensure right-continuity of t 7→ lim supuցt 1{u∈Ac} when α˜
ϑ
i (t) ∈ (0, 1).
Therefore, consider any fixed ϑ ∈ T and the associated set B = {lim supuցϑ 1{u∈Ac} >
lim infuցϑ 1{u∈Ac}}. On B, ϑ = τ˜(ϑ) a.s. because (ϑ, τ˜ (ϑ)) belongs to A up to a P -nullset.
Consider also a sequence ϑn ց ϑ (e.g., the previous one). By (B.20) then τ˜(ϑn) ց ϑ a.s. on
B. Moreover, for each n ∈ N, as ϑn > ϑ and lim infuցϑ 1{u∈Ac} = 0 on B, there must exist
some q ∈ (ϑ, ϑn) with q < τ˜(q) for each ω ∈ B, resp. supq∈Q+ 1{q>ϑ}((τ˜(q) ∧ ϑn)− q) > 0 on
B. The aim is now to select such q(ω) measurably, such that they form a stopping time τn.
Therefore, let
ln = min{l ∈ N |P [1B sup
q∈Q+
1{q>ϑ}((τ˜(q) ∧ ϑn)− q) > 2
−l] ≥ (1− n−1)P [B]}.
This means that the probability that B is realized and that some (grid) point 2k−ln with
k ∈ N belongs to an interval [q, τ˜ (q)) ∩ (ϑ, ϑn), i.e., to A ∩ (ϑ, ϑn), is at least (1 − n
−1)P [B].
As monotonicity implies τ˜(q) ≤ τ˜(2k−ln) for all rational q ≤ 2k−ln a.s. for any given k, we
have P [
⋃
k∈N{2
k−ln = τ˜(2k−ln)} ∩ {2k−ln ∈ A}] = 0 and thus still P [B ∩ (
⋃
k∈N{2
k−ln ∈
A ∩ (ϑ, ϑn)} ∩ {2
k−ln < τ˜(2k−ln)})] ≥ (1 − n−1)P [B]. Hence, if we define stopping times
τn,k with value 2
k−ln if this is in (ϑ, τ˜ (2k−ln) ∧ ϑn) and ϑn else for every k ∈ N, then these
only take values in ({2k−ln | k ∈ N} ∩ (ϑ, ϑn)) ∪ {ϑn} and P [B ∩ (
⋃
k∈N{τn,k = 2
k−ln ∈
(ϑ, τ˜ (2k−ln) ∧ ϑn)})] ≥ (1 − n
−1)P [B], so we can also define τn = mink∈N τk,n ∈ (ϑ, ϑn)
satisfying τ˜ (τn) = 1{τn=ϑn}τ˜(ϑn) +
∑
k∈N 1{τn=2k−ln}τ˜(2
k−ln) a.s. by (B.19) and thus P [B ∩
{τn < τ˜(τn)}] ≥ (1− n
−1)P [B].
Letting Cn = {τn < τ˜(τn)} for each n ∈ N, now Lτn ≤ U(L∧F )τ˜(τn)(τn) a.s. on Cn and
P [B ∩ Ccn] ≤ n
−1P [B]. Moreover, iterated expectations with B ∩B′ ∩ Ccn ∈ Fτn for any fur-
ther set B′ ∈ Fϑ and using that U(L∧F )τ˜(τn)(·) is a supermartingale yield E[1B∩B′∩Ccn(Lτn −
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U(L∧F )τ˜(τn)(τn))] ≤ E[1B∩B′∩Ccn(Lτn−U(L∧F )τ˜(τn)(τ˜(τn)))] = E[1B∩B′∩Ccn(Lτn−(L∧F )τ˜(τn))],
which vanishes by Lemma A.6 as n → ∞ (letting t = (n − 1)n−1), because L and F
are of class (D) and 1B∩B′∩Ccn → 0 in probability. Therefore, lim supn→∞E[1B∩B′ (Lτn −
U(L∧F )τ˜(τn)(τn))] ≤ lim supn→∞E[1B∩B′∩Cn(Lτn − U(L∧F )τ˜(τn)(τn))] ≤ 0. On the other hand,
letting similarly as before σn ∈ [τn, τ˜ (τn)] resp. attain U(L∧F )τ˜(τn)(τn) for each n ∈ N,
E[1B∩B′ (Lτn−U(L∧F )τ˜(τn)(τn))] = E[1B∩B′ (Lτn−(L∧F )σn)]→ E[1B∩B′ (Lϑ−Fϑ)] as n→∞
because τn ≤ σn ≤ τ˜(τn) ≤ τ˜(ϑn) → ϑ, Fϑ ≤ Lϑ by ϑ = τ˜(ϑ) on B, and L and F are right-
continuous and of class (D). Choosing B′ = {Lϑ > Fϑ} now shows that then B ∩ B
′ has
probability zero, i.e., a.s. lim supuցϑ 1{u∈Ac} = lim infuցϑ 1{u∈Ac} or Lϑ ≤ Fϑ.
Now apply this for the desired path property to ϑ′n = inf{t ≥ 0 | (lim supuցt 1{u∈Ac} −
lim infuցt 1{u∈Ac})(Lt − Ft) ≥ n
−1}, n ∈ N. ϑ′n is indeed a stopping time by the progressive
measurability of lim sup(·) remarked before and similarly of lim inf(·). The latters’ difference is
upper-semi-continuous and L− F even continuous from the right, so (lim supuցϑ′n 1{u∈Ac} −
lim infuցϑ′n 1{u∈Ac})(Lϑ′n − Fϑ′n) ≥ n
−1 a.s. on {ϑ′n < ∞}, showing that in fact ϑ
′
n = ∞
a.s. As this still holds simultaneously for all n ∈ N, indeed a.s. lim supuցt 1{u∈Ac} >
lim infuցt 1{u∈Ac} ⇒ Lt ≤ Ft for all t ∈ R+. Lt ≤ Ft implies furthermore α
ϑ
i (t) ∈ {0, 1}
and thus what we intended to show.
Finally, to verify that we obtain equilibrium payoffs as in Proposition 7.1 at each ϑ′ = τ˜(ϑ),
we first show that then ϑ′ = inf{t ≥ ϑ′ | α˜ϑ
′
i (t) > 0} =: τ˜
ϑ′ a.s. We have τ˜(ϑ′) = ϑ′ and
τ˜(τ˜ϑ
′
) = τ˜ϑ
′
a.s., the former by (B.19) and the latter as (τ, τ˜ (τ)) belongs to A up to a P -
nullset for any τ ∈ T and thus α˜ϑ
′
i (t) = 0 for all t ∈ (τ, τ˜(τ)) a.s. Now suppose that τ˜
ϑ′ > ϑ′
with positive probability. Then also τ˜ϑ
′
> inf{t ≥ ϑ′ |Lt > U(L∧F )τ˜ϑ
′ (t)} with positive
probability, because otherwise τ˜(ϑ′) ≥ τ˜ϑ
′
> ϑ′ with positive probability. Hence, letting
ϑ′n = inf{t ≥ ϑ
′ |Lt−U(L∧F )τ˜ϑ
′ (t) ≥ n−1}∧ τ˜ϑ
′
for any n ∈ N, limn→∞ P [{ϑ
′
n < τ˜
ϑ′}] > 0. On
{ϑ′n < τ˜
ϑ′}, Lϑ′n > U(L∧F )τ˜ϑ
′ (ϑ′n) by right-continuity. Then necessarily Lϑ′n > Fϑ′n and thus
αϑ
′
i (ϑ
′
n) > 0, so α˜
ϑ′
i (ϑ
′
n) = 0 implies lim supuցϑ′n 1{u∈Ac} = 0 and furthermore ϑ
′
n < τ˜(ϑ
′
n)
by (B.20). This, however, requires Lϑ′n ≤ U(L∧F )τ˜(ϑ′n)(ϑ
′
n), contradicting that the latter is at
most U
(L∧F )τ˜ϑ
′ (ϑ′n) by τ˜(ϑ
′
n) ≤ τ˜(τ˜
ϑ′) = τ˜ϑ
′
. Hence, P [{ϑ′n < τ˜
ϑ′}] = 0 for all n ∈ N, resp.
indeed τ˜ϑ
′
= ϑ′ a.s.
Now furthermore lim supuցϑ′ 1{u∈Ac} = 1 by (B.20) and thus α˜
ϑ′
i (ϑ
′) = αϑ
′
i (ϑ
′). From
Definition C.1, it is obvious that for any choice of i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j, and any strategy
(Gϑ
′
a , α
ϑ′
a ) for player i, the outcome probabilities only depend on the values of α
ϑ′
a , α˜
ϑ′
j at ϑ
′,
except when both are zero and also ϑ′ = inf{t ≥ ϑ′ |αϑ
′
a (t) > 0}; then also the values on
an arbitrarily short interval (ϑ′, ϑ′ + ε) with ε > 0 need to be known. In the former case,
the outcome probabilities from any such αϑ
′
a are thus the same for α˜
ϑ′
j and α
ϑ′
j . In the latter
case, λϑ
′
M = 0 for any such α
ϑ′
a and either of α˜
ϑ′
j or α
ϑ′
j , and α˜
ϑ′
j (ϑ
′) = αϑ
′
j (ϑ
′) = 0 implies
Lϑ′ = Fϑ′ , so player i’s expected payoff is Fϑ′ , whether against α˜
ϑ′
j or α
ϑ′
j . As moreover
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Gϑ
′
a = G
ϑ′
i with α
ϑ′
a = α˜
ϑ′
i or α
ϑ′
i resp. yields the same expected payoff in each case (in fact
even the same outcome probabilities also in the second case due to symmetry), (Gϑ
′
i , α˜
ϑ′
i ) and
(Gϑ
′
j , α˜
ϑ′
j ) inherit the equilibrium property from (G
ϑ′
i , α
ϑ′
i ) and (G
ϑ′
j , α
ϑ′
j ).
C Outcome probabilities
The following definition is a simplification of Definition 2.9 in Riedel and Steg (2017), resulting
from right-continuity of any αϑi (·) also where it takes the value zero. Right-continuity implies
that when αϑi (t) > 0, then infinitely many such “atoms” of approximately the same size
follow in any arbitrarily short time interval. Therefore, define the functions µL and µM from
[0, 1]2 \ (0, 0) to [0, 1] by
µL(x, y) :=
x(1− y)
x+ y − xy
and µM(x, y) :=
xy
x+ y − xy
,
which resp. yield the probability that player i stops first or that both players stop simultane-
ously in an infinitely repeated game where player i’s constant stage stopping probability is x
and player j’s y; 1−µL(x, y)−µM (x, y) = µL(y, x) is then the probability of player j stopping
first. An interval of atoms can also meet an isolated (conditional) atom ∆Gϑj (t)/(1−G
ϑ
j (t−))
played just once. Special care is needed when atoms become arbitrarily small, because µL
cannot be made continuous at the origin; see Riedel and Steg (2017) for more details. Recall
that αϑi (t) > 0 ⇒ G
ϑ
i (t) = 1 and that (1 − G
ϑ
i (τˆ
ϑ−))(1 − Gϑj (τˆ
ϑ−)) is the probability that
nobody stops before the extensions are used. For notational convenience, it is understood
that if (1−Gϑi (τˆ
ϑ−)) = 0, then (1−Gϑi (τˆ
ϑ−))/(1 −Gϑi (τˆ
ϑ−)) := 0.
Definition C.1. Given ϑ ∈ T and a pair of extended mixed strategies
(
Gϑ1 , α
ϑ
1
)
and
(
Gϑ2 , α
ϑ
2
)
,
the outcome probabilities λϑL,1, λ
ϑ
L,2 and λ
ϑ
M at τˆ
ϑ := inf{t ≥ ϑ |αϑ1 (t)+α
ϑ
2 (t) > 0} are defined
as follows. Let i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j.
If τˆϑ < τˆϑj := inf{t ≥ ϑ |α
ϑ
j (t) > 0}, then
λϑL,i :=
(
1−Gϑi (τˆ
ϑ−)
)(
1−Gϑj (τˆ
ϑ−)
)[
1−
∆Gϑj (τˆ
ϑ)
1−Gϑj (τˆ
ϑ−)
]
= ∆Gϑi (τˆ
ϑ)
(
1−Gϑj (τˆ
ϑ)
)
,
λϑM :=
(
1−Gϑi (τˆ
ϑ−)
)(
1−Gϑj (τˆ
ϑ−)
)
αϑi (τˆ
ϑ)
∆Gϑj (τˆ
ϑ)
1−Gϑj (τˆ
ϑ−)
= ∆Gϑi (τˆ
ϑ)∆Gϑj (τˆ
ϑ)αϑi (τˆ
ϑ).
If τˆϑ < τˆϑi := inf{t ≥ ϑ |α
ϑ
i (t) > 0}, then
λϑL,i :=
(
1−Gϑi (τˆ
ϑ−)
)(
1−Gϑj (τˆ
ϑ−)
) ∆Gϑi (τˆϑ)
1−Gϑi (τˆ
ϑ−)
(
1− αϑj (τˆ
ϑ)
)
= ∆Gϑi (τˆ
ϑ)∆Gϑj (τˆ
ϑ)
(
1− αϑj (τˆ
ϑ)
)
,
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λϑM :=
(
1−Gϑi (τˆ
ϑ−)
)(
1−Gϑj (τˆ
ϑ−)
) ∆Gϑi (τˆϑ)
1−Gϑi (τˆ
ϑ−)
αϑj (τˆ
ϑ) = ∆Gϑi (τˆ
ϑ)∆Gϑj (τˆ
ϑ)αϑj (τˆ
ϑ).
If τˆϑ = τˆϑ1 = τˆ
ϑ
2 and α
ϑ
1 (τˆ
ϑ) + αϑ2 (τˆ
ϑ) > 0, then
λϑL,i :=
(
1−Gϑi (τˆ
ϑ−)
)(
1−Gϑj (τˆ
ϑ−)
)
µL(α
ϑ
i (τˆ
ϑ), αϑj (τˆ
ϑ)),
λϑM :=
(
1−Gϑi (τˆ
ϑ−)
)(
1−Gϑj (τˆ
ϑ−)
)
µM (α
ϑ
1 (τˆ
ϑ), αϑ2 (τˆ
ϑ)).
If τˆϑ = τˆϑ1 = τˆ
ϑ
2 and α
ϑ
1 (τˆ
ϑ) + αϑ2 (τˆ
ϑ) = 0, then
λϑL,i :=
(
1−Gϑi (τˆ
ϑ−)
)(
1−Gϑj (τˆ
ϑ−)
) 1
2
{
lim inf
tցτˆϑ
αϑ
i
(t)+αϑ
j
(t)>0
µL(α
ϑ
i (t), α
ϑ
j (t))
+ lim sup
tցτˆϑ
αϑ
i
(t)+αϑ
j
(t)>0
µL(α
ϑ
i (t), α
ϑ
j (t))
}
,
λϑM := 0.
Remark C.2.
(i) λϑL,j is of course also the probability that player i becomes follower. It always holds that
λϑM+λ
ϑ
L,i+λ
ϑ
L,j = (1−G
ϑ
i (τˆ
ϑ−))(1−Gϑj (τˆ
ϑ−)). Dividing by (1−Gϑi (τˆ
ϑ−))(1−Gϑj (τˆ
ϑ−))
if feasible yields the corresponding conditional probabilities.
(ii) If αϑi (τˆ
ϑ) = 1, then player i stops for sure and no limit argument is needed. Otherwise,
both αϑ1 (·), α
ϑ
2 (·) are right-continuous and the corresponding limit of µM exists. µL,
however, has no continuous extension at the origin, whence we use the symmetric com-
bination of lim inf and lim sup, ensuring consistency whenever the limit does exist. If
the limit in a potential equilibrium does not exist, then both players will be indifferent
about the roles; see Lemma A.5 in Riedel and Steg (2017).
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